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Abstract
In the era of the global Internet, realspace sovereigns face new
problems relating to the scope and enforceability of their laws, many of
which are intended to protect local individuals and commercial entities.
How these traditional sovereigns respond to these challenges will have far-
reaching implications for the ordering of social and commercial behaviour
online. In this piece, we take up the case of the domain name system as an
example of challenges and solutions yet to come.
We begin by critically analyzing the United States response to
international disputes over domain names, the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act (ACPA), which offers a number of potential remedies to U.S.
trademark owners whose marks are registered as domain names by alleged
cybersquatters.  Most important for our purposes, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)
permits a trademark owner to seek cancellation or transfer of the domain
name by proceeding  in rem against the domain name itself, thereby
purporting to expand the scope of the ACPA to encompass disputes with
little direct connection with the United States.  Congress appears to have
developed § 1125(d)(2) based on a misunderstanding of the constitutional
requirements for adjudicative jurisdiction in the U.S. courts; and early court
decisions interpreting the provision have perpetuated the misunderstanding.
In reality, there exist no cases of foreign cybersquatting (aside from certain
cases involving anonymous registrants) as to which the in rem provision will
be both applicable and constitutional.  Thus, we conclude that the provision
is notable mainly for its aggressive approach to jurisdiction. This assessment
leads us to a broader consideration of the role of realspace sovereigns
(especially the United States) in the international regulation of the domain
names system.
Turning to this issue, we find that realspace sovereigns have a critical
(and yet overlooked) role in the continued viability of a global unsegmented
domain names system.  By mapping the logical control over the domain
names system  the distributed hierarchy that is the basis of the systems
design  onto realspace territory, the potential for sovereign regulation of the
system becomes apparent.  Such regulation can either be supported by
recognized principles of prescriptive jurisdiction in international law, or be
the de facto result of the geographic facts of the domain names system.  We
argue that the regulatory significance of geography, and the essentially
arbitrary nature of the present territorial locations of the key components of
the domain name system, lead to incentives for realspace sovereigns to alter
the geographic facts  primarily by establishing alternative root server
systems.  This in turn implies the future segmentation of the domain name
system, and the resulting dramatic decrease in its value.  Accordingly, we
argue that realspace sovereigns (and especially the United States) have strong
interests in avoiding segmentation, and thus must seek to coordinate the
r e g u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  s y s t e m .
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I
In the era of the global Internet, realspace sovereigns are presented
with new problems relating to the scope and enforceability of their laws,
many of which are intended to protect local individuals and commercial
entities.  How these traditional sovereigns respond to these challenges will
have far-reaching implications for the ordering of social and economic
behavior online.1   In this piece, we take up the case of the domain name
system as an example of challenges and solutions yet to come.  We begin by
critically analyzing the United States response to international disputes over
domain names, especially the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
(ACPA), which offers a number of potential remedies to U.S. trademark
owners whose marks are registered as domain names by alleged
cybersquatters.  The ACPA is notable for its assertions of both adjudicative
and prescriptive jurisdiction over foreign registrants; and we take up each of
those assertions in turn.
Looking first at the ACPAs provisions with respect to adjudicative
jurisdiction, we focus on 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2), which purports to authorize
a trademark owner to seek cancellation or transfer of a domain name by
proceeding in rem against the domain name itself in cases where the U.S.
courts could not assert personal jurisdiction over the alleged cybersquatter.
The text and history of the provision indicate that Congress intended to
authorize in rem proceedings in cases where a foreign registrants lack of
contacts with the United States would render a U.S. courts assertion of
personal jurisdiction over the registrant unconstitutional under the Due
Process Clause.  As we discuss, however, in such cases the registrants lack of
U.S. contacts will render in rem jurisdiction unconstitutional as well.  The
ACPAs in rem provision, therefore, fails effectively to reach the cases
Congress appears to have been targeting.  Aside from its constitutional
deficiencies, however, the in rem provision is conceptually intriguing
                                                      
1 There have been many contributions to this field.  See, e.g., David Post & David
Johnson, Law & Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996);
Jack Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI L. REV. 1199 (1998).  Margaret Jane
Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in
Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295 (1999); David Johnson & David Post, And
How Shall the Net Be Governed? A Meditation on the Relative Virtues of Decentralized,
Emergent Law, in COORDINATING THE INTERNET (B. Kahin and J. Keller eds., 1997);
Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for Cyberspace, 55 U. Pitt L. Rev 993 (1994);
Henry R Perrit, Jr. The Internet is Changing International Law, 73 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 997
(1998); A Michael Froomkin, Of Governments and Governance, 14 Berkeley Law &
Technology Journal 617 (1999); A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of
Regulatory Arbitrage (book chapter) in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE (Brian Kahin and
Charles Nesson, eds.) (MIT Press, 1997); Jonathan Weinberg, Internet Governance, in
Transnational Cyberspace Law (Makoto Ibusuki ed. 2000); Jonathan Weinberg,
ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 Duke L.J. 187 (2000); Milton Mueller,
ICANN and Internet Governance: Sorting through the debris of self-regulation. INFO 1, 6,
477-500, December 1999.
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because it turns on the assertion that the res in question (the domain name) is
located within the forum (the United States).  The ACPA thus attempts to
base in rem jurisdiction on the premise that a domain name is located in the
United States whenever either the dealer or the administrator involved in
registering or assigning the domain name is U.S.-based.2  Because the in rem
provision will in most instances be unconstitutional, the theoretical and
practical problems with this assertion are unlikely to gain prominence; but
they lead naturally to our consideration of the implications of Congresss
assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction over domain name disputes, and, more
broadly, the role of realspace sovereigns in domain name regulation.
We begin this second line of analysis by describing the aspects of
logical control over the domain names system, noting that the distributed
hierarchy in the systems design results correlates control over certain
components, especially the root servers, with control over the entire system.
By mapping the logical control structure onto the contours of realspace, the
potential regulatory authority of realspace sovereigns becomes apparent.
This regulatory authority can be grounded in either generally-accepted
principles of prescriptive jurisdiction, or the de facto result of the physical
location of elements of the domain name system.  In the prescriptive
jurisdiction case, we note that the location of certain elements  specifically
the root or TLD servers  within a sovereigns territory will in almost all
cases provide substantial international legal support for the states assertion
of jurisdiction.  And even if the sovereign's claim is not formally recognized,
we describe how control can be exerted nonetheless.  In either of these two
cases, the basic point is the same: geography matters.
Importantly, however, while geography matters for purposes of what
might be called territorial control over the domain names system, from a
logical standpoint it is largely irrelevant. Indeed, we note that the geographic
facts of the domain name system are uniquely mutable, providing both the
means and the incentive for realspace sovereigns to increase their regulatory
authority by altering the geographic facts  in our example, by creating and
mandating an alternative root server system.  This ability to exert regulatory
influence, we argue, should be disquieting to the global Internet community.
For a predictable result flowing from the creation of alternative root servers
is the segmentation of the domain names system, and its concomitant
reduction in value.
This insight  the important role that realspace sovereigns play in the
regulation of the domain names system  calls for a reconsideration of the
present regulatory approaches.  In particular, we note that the United States
(which arguably stands to lose the most from the segmentation of the domain
name system) would be better served in pursuing  the goal of international
coordination concerning domain names regulation, rather than the extensive
assertion of jurisdiction found in the ACPA.  We conclude by offering some
suggestions and observations about the steps that the United States in
particular, and realspace sovereigns more generally, might take to effectuate a
policy that reflects the substantial interest in an unsegmented domain names
                                                      
2 The terms used by the ACPA are registrar and registry.  To help distinguish
the functions of these two entities, we use the terms dealer and administrator.
See infra text accompanying note   .
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system.
II
Jur isdict ional Overre aching : The Anticy bersqu atting
Con sumer Protection A ct
Cybersquattingthe phenomenon targeted by the ACPAoccurs
when a person registers as a domain name a word or phrase trademarked by
another, and does so either in the hopes of selling the domain name to the
trademark holder, or with the goal of earning advertising revenue from the
visits of web users who are looking for the trademark holders web page.  In
passing the ACPA, Congress addressed this substantive problem by
prohibiting the bad-faith registration of a domain name consisting of
anothers mark.  Noting, however, the difficulties of suing foreign or
anonymous domain name registrants, Congress also created an unusual
procedural device for use in cases where the registrant cannot be located or
subjected to the jurisdiction of a United States court.  In such cases, the
ACPA authorizes the mark holder to bring an in rem s u i t3 directly against
the domain name itself.4  Although the available legislative history indicates
                                                      
3  In an in personam action, jurisdiction flows from the courts authority over the
defendants person, and any resulting judgment is potentially enforceable against
any assets of the defendant, wherever located.  By contrast, in an in rem action of
the type authorized by the ACPA, jurisdiction is based on the courts authority over
the reshere, the domain namerather than on authority over the defendants person.
Thus, any judgment in an in rem action is limited to the value of the res, and the
judgment can be enforced only against the res and not against any other interests of
the defendant.
4  See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A).  The ACPA purports to authorize an in rem civil
action.  Id.  Technically, the suit authorized by the ACPA could more accurately be
termed a quasi in rem Type 1 action, because it does not determine the plaintiffs
rights in the res as against all the world, but rather determines the relative rights of
the plaintiff and another specified person (here, the registrant) in the res.  See Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958).
One district court has recently taken a different view, arguing that ACPA in rem
actions . . . are of the true in rem genre because they involve the rights of a disputed
mark for every potential rights holder.  Cable News Network L.P., L.L.L.P. v.
Cnnews.com, 2001 WL 1111193, at *4 (E.D. Va. Sept. 18, 2001).  This assessment
seems at odds with the structure of the ACPAs in rem provisions.  The notice
requirements set forth in those provisions focus on the domain name registrant, and
no one else:  they require that the plaintiff send notice of the suit to the registrant
and publish[] notice of the action as the court may directmeasures which would
satisfy the due process requirements for notice of suit with respect to the registrant,
but not necessarily with respect to other entities that might have claims to the
domain name.  Similarly, ACPA claims turn on the conduct of the registrant, rather
than on the relative rights of the plaintiff and any person other than the registrant.
Moreover, the ACPA provides that a successful in rem plaintiff may obtain forfeiture,
cancellation or transfer of the domain name; but the statute does not suggest that a
successful ACPA plaintiff is thereby immunized from claims by any other person
asserting a superior right to the domain name.
In any event, the distinction between in rem actions and quasi in rem Type 1 actions
does not affect our analysis of the ACPAs provisions.  Cf. Restatement Second of
Judgments, § 6 cmt. b (questioning whether the traditional distinction is useful for
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that Congress believed the in rem provision closed a gap in the enforcement
tools available to mark holders, the reality is that this provision adds little to
the preexisting jurisdictional bases for ACPA suits.  The analysis that follows
examines the jurisdictional significance of the in rem provision, and concludes
that its greatest distinction lies not in its utility (which is minimal, due to
constitutional problems) but rather in its approach to the location of domain
names.
A
The  mecha nics  o f  the ACPA
To prevail on a claim under the ACPA, a plaintiff must show that it
is the owner of a protected mark, and that the defendant registered,
trafficked in or used a domain name that is identical or (in some cases)
confusingly similar to the plaintiffs mark.5  The ACPA also requires the
plaintiff to establish that the defendant acted with a bad faith intent to
profit from th[e] mark, and the Act includes a non-exhaustive list of nine
factors to be considered by the court when assessing the element of bad
faith.6  Finally, the Act provides a safe harbor for registrants who believed
and had reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was a
fair use or otherwise lawful.7  Where the prohibited acts occurred prior to
the Acts passage, the only remedies available are forfeiture or cancellation of
the domain name, or transfer of the domain name to the mark owner.8  For
subsequent violations, the Act authorizes the award of damages and costs,9
and it permits the plaintiff to elect statutory damages of $1,000 to $100,000,
as determined by the court.10  If appropriate, the court may award treble
damages, and in exceptional cases the court may also award a reasonable
attorneys fee.11
                                                                                                                       
any purpose).  Accordingly, for simplicity we will use the term in rem to describe
the ACPAs provisions.  Cf. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 n.17 (1977) (for
convenience, using in rem to denote both in rem and quasi in rem).
5  See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A).
6  Id. §§ 1125(d)(1)(A)(i), 1125(d)(1)(B).
7  Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii).
8  See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(C); Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 3010, 113 Stat. 1536 (providing that damages remedy shall not
be available with respect to the registration, trafficking, or use of a domain name
that occurs before the date of the enactment of this Act); Virtual Works, Inc. v.
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 239 F.3d 264, 268 (4th Cir. 2001).
9  S e e 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (providing that an ACPA plaintiff may recover (1)
defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the
action).
10  15 U.S.C. § 1117(d).
11  See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a); Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 487 (3d Cir. 2001)
(affirming award of attorneys fees under ACPA).
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B
A no nymous  regis trants
The ACPAs drafters believed that the remedies described above
would do little good if the plaintiff was unable to discover the registrants
identity.  The House Committee report noted that a significant problem
faced by trademark owners in the fight against cybersquatting is the fact that
many cybersquatters register domain names under aliases or otherwise
provide false information in their registration applications in order to avoid
identification and service of process by the mark owner.12  The federal
courts traditionally have disfavored suits against anonymous defendants, and
a plaintiff usually must identify and locate the defendant in order to effect
service of process.13  Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.coma suit initiated
prior to the passage of the ACPAillustrates the problem.   The assignee of
various trademarks associated with Sees Candy Shops, Inc. sued in federal
court, asserting federal and state law claims arising from the registration of
the domain names seescandy.com and seecandys.com by someone other
than the plaintiff.14  Because the registrant had provided incomplete or false
information when registering the domain names, the plaintiff was unable to
collect the information necessary to serve the complaint on the registrant.15
The district court recognized the plaintiffs need to ascertain the registrants
identity, butbalancing the plaintiffs interests against the legitimate and
valuable right to participate in online forums anonymously or
pseudonymously16it held that the plaintiff must satisfy a four-part test in
order to get discovery on the issue.17
The ACPAs in rem provision addresses this problem by removing the
need to identify an evasive registrant.  Under § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II), a mark
owner whose rights are violated by a domain nameand who would have had
an ACPA claim against the domain names registrantmay sue the domain
name instead of the registrant, if the owner is unable to find the registrant by
sending a notice to the postal and email addresses provided by the registrant
                                                      
12  H.R. REP. NO. 106-412 (1999).
13   See, e.g., Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 577-78 (N.D. Cal.
1999) (noting traditional reluctance for permitting filings against John Doe
defendants or fictitious names and stating that the default requirement in federal
court is that the plaintiff must be able to identify the defendant sufficiently that a
summons can be served on the defendant).
14  185 F.R.D. at 575.
15  Id. at 577.
16  Id. at 578.
17  First, the plaintiff should identify the missing party with sufficient specificity
such that the Court can determine that defendant is a real person or entity who
could be sued in federal court, id. at 578; second, the plaintiff should identify all
previous steps taken to locate the elusive defendant, id. at 579; third, plaintiff should
show that its claims could withstand a motion to dismiss, id.; and fourth, the
plaintiff should specify (and justify) the discovery requests and the entities to which
those requests would be addressed, see id. at 580.
[     Realspace Sovereigns in Cyberspace: Draft of October 25, 2001    ]
  6 
to the dealer.18  The Acts requirement that the plaintiff send the notice to
the addresses provided by the registrantcoupled with its requirement that
the plaintiff publish notice of the action, as directed by the court, promptly
after filing suitsatisfy the due process requirements for notice of suit.19
Thus, in situations where the registrant cannot be identified, the in rem
provision holds the promise of provid[ing] meaningful protection to
trademark owners while balancing the interests of privacy and anonymity on
the Internet.20
C
Reg istran ts  ove r whom in personam  ju risdic tion  i s  unavailabl e
In addition to the problem of anonymous registrants, the ACPAs
drafters also intended to tackle cases in which a non-U.S. resident
cybersquats on a domain name that infringes upon a U.S. trademark.21  To
this end, § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I) provides that the in rem action is also available
if the mark owner is unable to obtain in personam jurisdiction over the
registrant.22  The problem with this provision is thatas demonstrated
belowthere exist no cases of foreign cybersquatting as to which
§ 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I) will be both applicable and constitutional.  In order for
a court to have territorial jurisdiction in a particular case, there must be a
basis for jurisdiction, and the exercise of jurisdiction must be constitutional.
A review of the pertinent rules shows that there will always be a basis for in
personam jurisdiction over ACPA claims against foreign registrants, so long as
the exercise of such jurisdiction is constitutional.  Thus,
§ 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I)s requirement that in personam jurisdiction be
unavailable will be satisfied only in cases where the exercise of in personam
jurisdiction would violate due process.  In such cases, however, the exercise
                                                      
18  See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II).
19  See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)
(requiring notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections).  Although the ACPAs notice provisions will probably fail
to provide actual notice to a registrant who provides false or incomplete contact
information to the dealer, or who fails to keep that information current, such a
failure should not raise a due process problem.  Cf. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,
264 (1983) (approving statutory notice scheme, despite its failure to provide actual
notice to appellant, because the right to receive notice was completely within
appellants control).
20  145 CONG. REC. S10513-02 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1999) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
Senator Hatch noted that some have suggested that dissidents or others who are
online incognito for similar legitimate reasons might give false information to
protect themselves and have suggested the need to preserve a degree of anonymity
on the Internet particularly for this reason.  Id.  The quasi in rem provision addresses
this concern by decreas[ing] the need for trademark owners to join the hunt to
chase down and root out these dissidents or others seeking anonymity on the Net. 
Id.
21  H.R. REP. NO. 106-412 (1999).
22  15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
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of in rem jurisdiction will be unconstitutional as well.
1
Bases for  jurisdiction
 A review of existing rules and doctrines indicates that there will
generally be a basis for in personam jurisdiction over claims against foreign
registrants.  Such a basis will be unavailable only where the exercise of in
personam jurisdiction is unconstitutionala situation addressed in Part __
below.
For suits in federal court,23 the basis for jurisdiction is found in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, which authorizes service of process on the
defendant.  If a foreign registrant has minimum contacts with a particular
state in the U.S. and if those contacts meet the requirements of the relevant
state long-arm statute, the plaintiff can sue in federal district court in that
state and can serve the defendant extraterritorially pursuant to Rule
4(k)(1)(A).24  If the registrant lacks sufficient minimum contacts to be subject
to jurisdiction in any particular stateor if the facts of the case do not fit the
relevant states long-arm statutethen the plaintiff can turn to Rule 4(k)(2).25
That Rule authorizes service of process on a foreign defendant, in a federal
question case, so long as the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in the
courts of any state, and so long as the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States.26  The use of Rule
4(k)(2) is consistent with the ACPA because nothing in the ACPA forbids
worldwide service of process on an in personam defendant.  However, the use
of Rule 4(k)(2) to authorize in personam jurisdiction over ACPA claims against
a foreign registrant may violate due process, in which event Rule 4(k)(2) is (by
its own terms) inapplicable.
                                                      
23  It appears that the federal and state courts possess concurrent jurisdiction over
in personam suits under the ACPA.  Cf. Aquatherm Indus., Inc. v. Florida Power &
Light Co., 84 F.3d 1388, 1394 (11th Cir. 1996) (federal courts do not have exclusive
jurisdiction over Lanham Act claims).  Plaintiffs will sometimes be better advised to
sue in federal court, however, because the jurisdictional reach of a state court will in
some instances be less extensive than that of a federal court.  See infra note   .  This
advantage may help to explain the apparent dearth of state-court ACPA cases (a
Westlaw search of the allstates database on August 18, 2001 revealed no cases
involving ACPA claims).   For purposes of simplicity, this article focuses on ACPA
suits brought in federal court.
24  See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (authorizing service of process on defendant who
could be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state in
which the district court is located).
25  Neither the ACPA nor the Lanham Act addresses the question of service of
process for in personam actions.  See, e.g., ISI Intl, Inc. v. Borden Ladner Gervais LLP,
256 F.3d 548, 550 (7th Cir. 2001) (Lanham Act does not authorize worldwide service of
process); Quokka Sports, Inc. v. Cup Intl Ltd., 99 F. Supp.2d 1105, 1110 (N.D. Cal.
1999) (same, with respect to claims under Lanham Act and ACPA).  Thus, Rule
4(k)(1)(D)which permits service of process when authorized by a statute of the
United Statesis inapplicable.
26  FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2).
[     Realspace Sovereigns in Cyberspace: Draft of October 25, 2001    ]
  8 
In sum, Rule 4 will always provide a basis for in personam jurisdiction
over ACPA claims against foreign registrants, unless the exercise of such
jurisdiction would be unconstitutional.  It is to the constitutional analysis,
thus, that we now turn.
2
Constitut ionali ty  of in  person am  ju risdiction
In personam suits against foreign registrants may be constitutional in a
number of situations, including cases where the domain name was registered
with a U.S.-based dealer.  In other instancesas where the registrant uses a
foreign-based dealerdue process requirements will often not be met,
because the registrant will lack minimum contacts with the United States
and the exercise of in personam jurisdiction will be unreasonable.
At the outset, a brief discussion of terminology may be helpful.
Registrars are entities authorized by ICANN to register domain names on
behalf of registrants;27 they function as intermediaries between the individual
registrants and the domain name registry.  While there are now multiple
registrars (not all of which are based in the U.S.), each TLD has only one
registry, which maintains the single authoritative set of records concerning
domain names and their registrants.28  Verisign Global Registry Services, a
Virginia-based corporation,29 operates the registry for the .com, .org, and
.net TLDs,30 which account for over 85 % of all current domain names.31
Thus, the relevant registrar may be either a U.S.-based or a foreign
corporation, but the pertinent registry for most current domain names is
controlled by a U.S.-based corporation.  To help distinguish between the two
types of entities, we will generally refer to the registrar as the dealer and
the registry as the administrator.
To meet the requirements of due process, the defendant must
possess minimum contacts with the United States32 and the exercise of
                                                      
27  See Fleetboston Financial Corp. v. Fleetbostonfinancial.com, 38 F.Supp.2d 121,
123 (2001).
28  See id.
29  Verisigns website indicates that it is headquartered in Virginia.  S e e
http://www.verisign-grs.com/aboutus/contact.html (visited August 17, 2001).
30  See Smith v. Network Solutions, Inc., 135 F.Supp.2d 1159, 1163.
31  S e e http://www.verisign-grs.com/dns/ (visited August 17, 2001) (asserting that
.com, .org and .net domain names comprise over 85% of registered domain names
worldwide).
32  Although the Supreme Court has reserved judgment on the question, see Omni
Capital International, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1987)
(unanimous opinion); Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 n.*
(1987) (plurality opinion), it appears that, when a foreign defendant is sued under a
federal statute authorizing worldwide service of process, the court may aggregate all
of the defendants United States contacts in order to assess whether the assertion of
jurisdiction would comport with due process under the Fifth Amendment.  See, e.g.,
Go-Video v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1416 (9th Cir. 1989).
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jurisdiction must not be unreasonable.  The minimum contacts
requirementwhich is designed to prevent the assertion of jurisdiction over a
defendant having no significant contacts, ties, or relations with the
forum33is satisfied when a defendant purposefully directed its actions at
the forum and the litigation arises out of or relates to those acts.34  Several
factors support the argument that a registrant who uses a U.S.-based dealer to
acquire a domain name thereby creates minimum contacts with the U.S.
Although the registrant may communicate with the dealer solely over the
Internet, the Court has held that minimum contacts may be found even
when the defendant never physically entered the forum.35  It seems likely that
most registrants will be aware of the nationality of the dealer they use.  The
dealers website will usually provide reasonable notice that the dealer is a
U.S.-based corporation, and may even reveal the specific location of the
dealers physical headquarters.  In instances where a reasonable person would
infer from the dealers website that the dealer is U.S.-based, registrants who
contract with that dealer to register a domain name can be seen as
purposefully directing their activities to the United States.36
The allegations by which the plaintiff seeks to meet the ACPAs bad
faith element37 may establish further connections between the registrant and
                                                                                                                       
Thus, in cases where the defendant lacks minimum contacts with the state in
which the district court sits, but has contacts with other parts of the United States,
the contacts can be aggregated to satisfy the minimum contacts analysis under Rule
4(k)(2).  See, e.g., ISI Intl, 256 F.3d at 551 (holding that federal court can exercise
jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2) over defendant who has ample contacts with the
nation as a whole, but whose contacts are so scattered among states that none of
them would have jurisdiction).  Likewise, because the ACPAs quasi in rem section
provides for worldwide service of process, see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) & (B), this
article assumes that a federal district court asserting jurisdiction under that section
should assess whether the defendant possesses minimum contacts with the United
States as a whole, rather than with the state in which the district court sits.
33  International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
34  Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984); see also Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).  General
jurisdictionwhich exists when a defendants contacts with the forum are
sufficiently extensive to support jurisdiction over claims unrelated to the
contactswill usually not be available in ACPA cases involving foreign
cybersquatters.
35  See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476.
36  Although a defendants contract with a forum resident will not always suffice to
establish minimum contacts, such contacts may be shown by the circumstances of
the contract.  See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478-79; McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1264-65 (6th
Cir. 1996).  In ACPA cases, the defendant will have entered into a contract with a
U.S. dealer; the registration will have affected U.S. commerce; and the defendant
may have shown an intent to damage the U.S. business of the holder of a mark
protected under U.S. law.
37  The statute makes bad faith an element of in personam ACPA claims.  See 15
U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1).  The ACPAs in rem provision does not explicitly mention bad
faith.  However, it authorizes a suit in rem if (1) the domain name violates the
plaintiffs trademark rights and (2) the plaintiff is unable to obtain in personam
jurisdiction over, or is unable to locate, a person who would have been a defendant
in a civil action under the ACPAs in personam provisions.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A).
A number of courts have concluded that this reference to the in personam provisions
incorporates the bad faith element into the in rem claim as well.  See Broadbridge
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the United States.  In assessing whether the plaintiff has properly alleged
that the registrant acted with a bad faith intent to profit from [the
plaintiffs] mark,38 the ACPA advises the court to consider several factors,
including the [registrants] intent to divert consumers from the mark
owner's online location to a site accessible under the domain name,39 and
the [registrant's] offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain name
to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain.40  Where a
registrant takes such actions against a U.S.-based mark owner,41 the
registrant can be seen as intending to cause an effect within the United
States, thus creating contacts for jurisdictional purposes.42  Moreover, a
registrants choice of a .com domain name (rather than a domain name
based on a country-code TLD) may sometimes suggest an intent to target
U.S. markets.43
It should be noted, however, that in five of the six cases to address
the question to date44 the court has held that a foreign defendants
registration of a domain name with a U.S. dealer does not create minimum
contacts sufficient to confer in personam jurisdiction on a federal court in the
district where the dealer is located.  One early decision under the ACPA did
indicate (without discussion) that a registrants action in registering the
pertinent domain name with NSI (a Virginia corporation) sufficed to satisfy
due process for purposes of in personam jurisdiction.45  The five subsequent
                                                                                                                       
Media, L.L.C. v. Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp.2d 505, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (bad faith is an
element of ACPA in rem claims); Harrods Limited v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 110
F. Supp.2d 420, 425 (E.D. Va. 2000) (following Broadbridge Media); Hartog & Co. AS v.
Swix.com, 136 F. Supp.2d 531, 539 (E.D. Va. 2001) (following Harrods).
38  15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i).
39  Id.  § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V).
40  Id.  § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VI).
41  Foreign holders of U.S. trademarks can also sue under the ACPA; but a foreign
plaintiff would presumably have to show effects on U.S. commerce in order to state a
claim.  Cf. [Vanity Fair etc.]
42  See Panavision Intl, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding
minimum contacts with California, under Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984),
because defendant knew that scheme of registering plaintiffs trademarks as domain
names would have the effect of injuring [plaintiff] in California where [plaintiff] has
its principal place of business and where the movie and television industry is
centered).
43  See, e.g., Quokka Sports, Inc. v. Cup Intl Ltd., 99 F.Supp.2d 1105, 1111-12 (N.D.
Cal. 1999) (finding that New Zealand defendants targeted the United States when,
instead of choosing a .nz domain name, they registered a .com domain name with
a U.S.-based dealer; defendants admitted that they sought out a specific domain
name to target the lucrative American market).
44  The issue has been addressed in six published opinions, by three district judges
and one magistrate judge, in the Eastern District of Virginia.  See infra notes    -   .
One of the cases, Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodome.com, 106 F. Supp.2d 860
(E.D. Va. 2000), is currently on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit.
45   S e e Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp.2d 528, 531 n.5
(E.D. Va. 2000).
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decisions, however, have held to the contrary.46  The courts finding a due
process violation have reasoned that the utility of a domain name depends in
part on the registrars meeting its obligations, and in part on the operation of
the [domain name system], only a small portion of which falls within the
domain name registrars control.47  Moreover, the typical domain name
registration transaction is brief, is conducted over the Internet, involves no
negotiation of terms, and does not require the dealer to perform substantial
services in its home state.48  These analyses generally appear to assume that
the minimum contacts analysis should look to the registrants contacts with a
particular state, rather than aggregating all of the registrants contacts with
the United States.  As noted above, that assumption is erroneous;49 and the
courts preoccupation with assessing the registrants contacts with the state
of Virginia, rather than with the United States as a whole, may have altered
some factors in the analysis.  Thus, for instance, while it may be true that the
registrant of a .com domain name would be unaware that NSI is located in
Virginia,50 it is far less plausible that such a registrant would be unaware that
it was dealing with a U.S. dealer.  On the whole, however, it does not appear
that nationwide aggregation of contacts would have altered the conclusion of
these courts that registration with a U.S. dealer does not suffice to create
minimum contacts.
Whether or not the use of a U.S.-based dealer creates minimum
contacts, it seems clear that the involvement of a U.S.-based administrator,
without more, should not create the requisite contacts.51  Registrants
typically have no direct interaction with the administrator.  Thus, a French
registrant might use a dealer based in France to register a .com domain
name, unaware that the administrator that will record the domain name is
located in the United States.  Unless other factors indicate that the registrant
aimed its acts at the United States, such a registrant lacks sufficient contacts
with the forum to justify the exercise of jurisdiction over the domain name.
In any event, even if minimum contacts exist, a defendant can
nonetheless secure dismissal if it can show that the exercise of jurisdiction
                                                      
46  See America Online, Inc. v. Huang, 106 F. Supp.2d 848, 857 (E.D. Va. 2000)
(holding that domain name registration agreements did not create a sufficient
relationship between [the registrant] and Virginia to satisfy due process);
Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodome.com, 106 F.Supp.2d 860, 865 (E.D. Va.
2000) (following America Online); Banco Inverlat, S.A. v. www.inverlat.com, 112 F.
Supp.2d 521, 522 n.1 (E.D. Va. 2000) (following Heathmount); Hartog & Co. AS v.
swix.com, 136 F. Supp.2d 531, 536 n.5 (E.D. Va. 2001) (following Heathmount); Cable
News Network L.P., L.L.L.P. v. Cnnnews.com, 2001 WL 1111193, at *3 n.16 (E.D. Va.
Sept. 18, 2001) (citing America Online and Heathmount).
47  America Online, 106 F. Supp.2d at 853.
48  America Online, 106 F. Supp.2d at 855 n.21; Heathmount, 106 F. Supp.2d at 866-
67.
49  See supra note __.
50  See Heathmount, 106 F. Supp.2d at 866 & n.7.
51  The fact that no published opinion to date addresses the latter question
suggests that potential plaintiffs agree with this assessment.
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would nonetheless be unreasonable,52 based on a five-factor test that
considers the burden on the defendant, the forums interest in hearing the
dispute, the plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief, the international judicial
systems interest in the efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared
interests of various nations in furthering substantive social policies.53  The
burden on a foreign defendant of litigating an ACPA claim in the United
States admittedly will be considerable.54  In addition, the policies of other
nations with respect to the regulation of trademarks, and domain names in
particular, may differ substantially from those of the United States; and a
United States courts adjudication of an ACPA claim may contravene such
policies.55  Balanced against the burden on the defendant and the effect on
other countries trademark policies, however, are the United States interest
in adjudicating the dispute and the plaintiffs interest in obtaining effective
relief.56  The ACPA grew out of congressional concern that U.S. businesses
lacked recourse against cybersquatters, including foreign cybersquatters.  Its
remedies are presumably available only to holders of a mark protected under
United States law; and though neither the plaintiff nor the defendant need
be a U.S. citizen, the Act applies only in cases where the bad-faith
                                                      
52  See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985) (indicating that
defendant has burden of demonstrating unreasonableness).
53  When the Court enunciated these five factors in World-Wide Volkswagen, 444
U.S. at 292 (dictum), and applied them in Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-77, 482-84, it
was evaluating state courts assertions of jurisdiction over defendants located outside
the forum state but within the U.S.  Accordingly, the Court described the last two
factors in terms applicable to interstate, rather than international, disputes: the
interstate judicial systems interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies and the shared interest of the several States in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies.  World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
The Court has since noted that the application of these two factors to the assertion
of jurisdiction over a foreign defendant calls for a court to consider the procedural
and substantive policies of other nations whose interests are affected by the assertion
of jurisdiction.  Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, 480
U.S. 102, 115 (1987) (holding California state courts assertion of jurisdiction over
Japanese defendant unreasonable under the circumstances).
54  See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987) (The
unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system
should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long
arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders.).
55 On the other hand, Asahis treatment of the reasonableness factors also suggests
that the social policies of other nations may weigh more heavily in the defendants
favor when a state court asserts jurisdiction than when a federal court asserts
jurisdiction under a federal statute.  The Asahi Court noted that a state courts
assertion of jurisdiction over an alien defendant must be assessed in the light of the
federal governments interest in guiding foreign relations.  See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115.
Where Congress has enacted legislation authorizing suit against a foreign
cybersquatter, a federal courts assertion of jurisdiction may be less open to question
because the concern of state interference with federal foreign policy does not arise.
56  See id. (When minimum contacts have been established, often the interests of
the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the serious
burdens placed on the alien defendant.).  It could also be argued that the fifth
factorthe international interest in efficient dispute resolutionfavors the plaintiff,
because an ACPA suit provides a means to determine the rights of each party in the
relevant domain name.
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registration has a significant effect on U.S. commerce.57  So long as the
plaintiff brings suit in a district within the state where the dealer is located,
the reasonableness analysis may on balance favor the exercise of jurisdiction.
3
Constitut ionali ty  of in  rem  ju risdiction
As we have seen, the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over ACPA
claims against foreign registrants will sometimes be constitutional, but in
other cases the exercise of jurisdiction will violate due process.  In the latter
instances, § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I) purports to make in rem jurisdiction available.
Contrary to the apparent expectations of the ACPAs drafters, however, due
process requires that there be minimum contacts between the registrant
and the forum, no matter whether the ACPA claims are denominated in
personam or in rem.  In cases where the assertion of in personam jurisdiction
would violate due process, the assertion of in rem jurisdiction would likewise
be unconstitutional.
The drafters of the ACPA apparently assumed that a foreign
registrant who violated the ACPAs prohibition on bad-faith registration of a
domain name58 would lack minimum contacts with the forum sufficient to
satisfy the due process requirements for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction,59 but that the in rem provision would help to fill this gap.  The
ACPAs drafters predicted that in rem suits would not offend due process,
since the property and only the property is the subject of the jurisdiction,
not other substantive personal rights of any individual defendant.60  In
keeping with this view, a number of courts applying the ACPA have accepted
the notion that in rem jurisdiction is available despite the absence of
                                                      
57  Cases under other provisions of the Lanham Act indicate that one of the major
factors in determining the Lanham Acts reach is whether the defendants alleged
conduct had a significant effect on U.S. commerce.  See, e.g., Buti v. Perosa, 139 F.3d
98, 104 n.2, 105 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming dismissal of foreign defendants Lanham Act
counterclaim because defendant failed to use its mark in commerce in the United
States and the mark was not a famous mark); Nintendo of America, Inc. v.
Aeropower Co., Ltd., 34 F.3d 246, 249 n.5 (4th Cir. 1994) (Lanham Act reaches
extraterritorial conduct which has a significant effect on United States
Commerce).
58  The ACPA also prohibits bad-faith trafficking in or use of domain names, see 15
U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A), but for purposes of simplicity the discussion in the text
focuses on the case of bad-faith registration.  The jurisdictional issues raised in suits
alleging trafficking or use would be similar to those in cases of bad-faith registration;
if anything, the case for jurisdiction might be stronger in trafficking or use cases, to
the extent that such activities provided additional contacts between the defendant
and the United States.
59  See H.R. REP. NO. 106-412 (1999) (stating that personal jurisdiction cannot be
established over the domain name registrant when the registrant is not a U.S.
resident).
60  H.R. REP. NO. 106-412.
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minimum contacts for in personam purposes.61  Such a conclusion, however,
contravenes the Supreme Courts statement in Shaffer v. Heitner62 that all
assertions of jurisdiction63whether in personam, in rem or quasi in remmust
meet the minimum contacts requirements developed in International Shoe64
and its progeny.
Shaffer involved attachment jurisdictionalso known as quasi in
rem Type 2 jurisdictionbut the Shaffer Court made clear that the principles
it set forth also apply to in rem and quasi in rem Type 1 jurisdiction.  In
Shaffer, the Delaware state courts took jurisdiction of a shareholders
derivative suit against officers and directors of a Delaware corporation,65
based on the attachment, pursuant to a Delaware statute, of corporate stock
and options owned by the individual defendants.66  (Under a Delaware
statute, the stock of a Delaware corporation was deemed to be located
within the state for purposes of attachment.67)    The plaintiff alleged that the
individual defendants had breached their duties to the corporation by
causing the corporation and a subsidiary to engage in activities in Oregon
that led to a civil damages award and a large criminal contempt fine.68  The
Delaware courts denied the defendants jurisdictional challenge, reasoning
that quasi in rem jurisdiction, which traditionally was based on attachment of
property within the jurisdiction, did not require that the defendants have
contacts with the forum.69  The Supreme Court, however, reversed, rejecting
both the jurisdictional conclusion and its premise.  Noting that under
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,70 the relationship among the defendant,
the forum, and the litigation had become the central concern of the inquiry
into personal jurisdiction,71 the Court proceeded to consider whether the
                                                      
61  See Heathmount, 106 F. Supp.2d at 867-68 (finding insufficient contacts for the
exercise of in personam jurisdiction, but allowing quasi in rem claim to proceed); Banco
Inverlat, 112 F. Supp.2d at 522 n.1 (same); Hartog, 136 F. Supp.2d at 536 & n.5 (same);
Cable News Network, 2001 WL at *4 (same).
62  433 U.S. 186 (1977).
63 The statement in Shaffer pertained to assertions of state-court jurisdiction, 433
U.S. at 212, but the Courts reasoning is equally applicable to the exercise of
jurisdiction by federal courts.  See infra text accompanying notes       .
64  International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
65 The suit named as defendants Greyhound Corp., Greyhounds
wholly owned subsidiary Greyhound Lines, Inc., and 28 current or former
officers or directors of one or both entities.  Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 189-90.
66 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 190-94.
67  Id. at 192 n.9.
68  Id. at 190.
69  Id. at 196.
70  326 U.S. 310 (1945).
71  Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204.
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Shoe  standard should be held to govern actions in rem as well as i n
personam.72  Because judicial jurisdiction over a thing (the traditional
conception of in rem jurisdiction) is merely a customary elliptical way of
referring to jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing,73 the Court
concluded that in order to justify an exercise of jurisdiction in rem, the basis
for jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify in personam jurisdictioni.e., it
must meet the minimum-contacts standard elucidated in International
Shoe.74  The Court made clear that this standard applied to all assertions of
in rem jurisdiction, not just to the type of quasi in rem jurisdiction that was at
issue in Shaffer itself: the Court stated flatly that all assertions of state-court
jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in
International Shoe and its progeny, and it added that [t]o the extent that
prior decisions are inconsistent with this standard, they are overruled.75
Consistent with its stated intention to set a standard for application
to all in rem cases, the Court took pains to assess the likely effect of its new
approach on different types of in rem jurisdiction.  Under Shoe, although the
mere presence of property within the forum will not in itself justify
jurisdiction, it is not irrelevant, for it can help to provide the requisite
minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum.  As the Court put
it, when claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying
controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unusual for
the State where the property is located not to have jurisdiction, since the
defendants claim to property located in the State would normally indicate
that he expected to benefit from the States protection of his interest.76
Moreover, in such cases the forum will often have strong interests in
assuring the marketability of property within its borders and in providing a
procedure for peaceful resolution of disputes about the possession of that
property, and relevant evidence and witnesses will often be found within the
forum77factors which would support the argument that the exercise of
jurisdiction would be reasonable.  Accordingly, the Court concluded that its
extension of the Shoe standard to all assertions of state-court jurisdiction
appeared unlikely to affect jurisdiction over most in rem actions other than
those in which the property attached was unrelated to the claim.78
The Court recognized, however, that in quasi in rem Type 2 cases such
                                                      
72  Id. at 206.
73  Id. at 207 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
§ 56, Introductory Note (1971)).
74  Id.
75  Id. at 212 & n.39.
76  Id. at 207-08.
77  Id. at 208.
78  Id.
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as Shaffer itself, the imposition of the Shoe standard would result in
significant change, because the defendants ownership of property within
the forum would be unrelated to the plaintiffs cause of action.79  Where the
cause of action does not relate to or arise out of the defendants contacts
with the forum, those contacts will not meet the Shoe standard unless they
are continuous and systematica test that will not be met by the mere
ownership of property within the forum.80  In Shaffer, the Court concluded
that neither the defendants ownership of stock in the Delaware corporation
nor their positions as officers or directors of that corporation provided the
requisite minimum contacts for purposes of the shareholders derivative suit;
accordingly, it held that the Delaware courts assertion of jurisdiction
violated due process.81
Although it might at first seem that the ACPAs in rem provisions
satisfy the minimum contacts analysis sketched out in Shaffer, such an
argument cannot withstand scrutiny.  The argument would be that a plaintiff
can bring an ACPA in rem suit only when the domain name was registered by
a United States dealer or administrator; that in such instances the ACPA
deems the domain name to be property located within the United States; and
that the plaintiffs claim thus arises directly out of a claim to the registrants
property located within the forum.  However, as the Shaffer Court noted,
even in cases where the plaintiffs cause of action arises out of or relates to
the defendants claim of ownership of the pertinent property, the presence of
that property within the forum will not always support the inference of
contacts between the defendant and the forum.  (The Court suggested that
such an inference might be unfounded, for example, in cases where a chattel
was brought into the forum without the owners consent or where the
plaintiffs fraud induced the owner to send the chattel into the forum.82)
The Shaffer Courts caveat foreshadows the issues raised by the
ACPA. The ACPAs in rem provision authorizes suits against domain names
registered with a U.S.-based dealer or a U.S.-based administrator (such suits
are to be brought in the judicial district in which the domain name registrar,
domain name registry, or other domain name authority that registered or
assigned the domain name is located83).  Assuming that Congress has the
authority to designate domain names as a form of property that can be
subjected to attachment for purposes of in rem jurisdiction, and assuming
further that Congress has the authority to provide that such domain names
                                                      
79  Id. at 208.
80  Continuous and systematic contacts with the forum have been
held sufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction over an unrelated claim against
a corporation.  See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48
(1952).
81  See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 213-17.
82  See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 208 n.25 (citing Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws § 60, cmts. c & d).
83  15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A).
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are located within the United States whenever the dealer or administrator
involved in registering the domain name is located within the U.S., the
resulting presence of the domain name within the United States does not,
without more, provide sufficient minimum contacts between the registrant
and the United States.84  If, for example, the registrant registered the domain
name with a foreign dealer and had no idea that the domain name would be
administered by a United-States-based registry, the presence of the domain
name within the United States would not indicate the existence of minimum
contacts between the registrant and the United States.  In sum, the
presence of the domain name within the United States adds nothing to the
minimum contacts analysis that would apply to a suit in personam; either the
registrant has sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy due process, or else the
Shoe standard will bar the exercise of any type of jurisdiction, either in rem or
in personam.85
The result of the application of Shaffer to the ACPA in rem provision
is that the provision is of use only in cases involving anonymous registrants;
in cases where, instead, the registrant is known but cannot be subjected to an
in personam ACPA claim, the registrants lack of minimum contacts with the
United States will similarly bar the assertion of in rem jurisdiction.  Two
district courts in the Eastern District of Virginia have resisted this
conclusion, arguing that Shaffer does not require the application of minimum
contacts analysis to ACPA in rem actions.86  For example, the court in Cable
News Network L.P., L.L.L.P. v. Cnnews.com87 (CNN) held that in an ACPA in
rem action, it is not necessary that the allegedly infringing registrant have
minimum contacts with the forum.88  The arguments advanced to support
this assertion fall into three general categories: that Shaffers requirement of
minimum contacts is dictum as applied to the in rem cause of action created
by the ACPA and can thus be disregarded;89 that Justice Scalias plurality
                                                      
84   Cf. Fleetboston Financial Corp. v. Fleetbostonfinancial.com, 138 F. Supp.2d 121,
134 (D. Mass. 2001).
85 Shaffer also forecloses the argument that the limited nature of the remedies
available through an in rem suit loosens the requirements of due process, see, e.g.,
America Online, 105 F. Supp.2d at 858 n.32 (holding that registration of a domain name
did not create minimum contacts sufficient for in personam jurisdiction, and
distinguishing a quasi in rem ACPA case on the ground that the registrants contact
with [the registrar] satisfied due process in light of the limited relief available under
the in rem proceeding, namely forfeiture of the domain name in question).  While
the Shaffer Court recognized that the potential liability of a defendant in an in rem
action is limited by the value of the property, it found this fact irrelevant to the due
process analysis because the fairness of subjecting the defendant to jurisdiction does
not depend on the size of the claim being litigated.  Shaffer,  433 U.S. at 207 n.23.
86  See Cable News Network L.P., L.L.L.P. v. Cnnews.com, 2001 WL
1111193, at *4 (E.D.Va. Sept. 18, 2001); Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-palace.com,
112 F.Supp.2d 502, 504 (E.D.Va. 2000).  It appears that the drafters of the
ACPA relied on this contention as well.  See H.R. REP. NO. 106-464 (1999).
87  2001 WL 1111193 (E.D. Va. Sept. 18, 2001).
88  Id. at *4.
89   The CNN court reasoned that Shaffers language regarding true in
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opinion in Burnham v. Superior Court90 somehow overruled Shaffers
requirement of minimum contacts for in rem actions; and that other
authorities provide some basis for a refusal to apply the minimum contacts
test to ACPA in rem claims.  Each of these arguments, however, fails.
As demonstrated above, the Shaffer Court clearly intended to extend
the International Shoe framework to all cases of in rem jurisdiction; and
whether that extension was dictum or holding, it should be applied to the in
rem provisions of the ACPA.91 Notably, the Shaffer Court itself characterized
as a holding its conclusion that any assertion of state-court jurisdiction
must satisfy the International Shoe standard.92  Moreover, Shaffers core
principlethat jurisdiction over a thing is merely another way of describing
jurisdiction over the interests of persons in that thingapplies with equal
force to all in rem cases, whether or not the cause of action is related to the
property that forms the basis for jurisdiction.  Indeed, recognizing this, the
majority in Shaffer analyzed the probable effects of the holding on cases in
which claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying
controversy.93  Even if Shaffers statement is dictum as it applies to in rem
and quasi in rem Type 1 cases,94 it is carefully considered dictum.  When the
Supreme Court articulates a general principle of constitutional doctrine, and
especially when the Court takes painsas it did in Shafferto assess the
implications of that principle for contexts other than that of the case at
hand, lower courts should be slow to brush the principle aside as mere
dictum.95
                                                                                                                       
rem and quasi in rem I matters was unnecessary to the holding and is therefore
non-binding dicta.  Cable News Network, 2001 WL at *4.
90  495 U.S. 604 (1990).
91 See Fleetboston Financial Corp. v. Fleetbostonfinancial.com, 138 F. Supp.2d 121,
134 (D. Mass. 2001) (The logic of Shaffers limitations would appear to extend to
actions in which the existence of the property in the state cannot fairly be said to
represent meaningful contacts between the forum state, the defendant, and the
litigation.  While this will generally be type II quasi in rem actions, it will not be so
exclusively.).
92  Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 208 (stating that [i]t appears . . . that jurisdiction over
many types of actions which now are or might be brought in rem would not be
affected by a holding that any assertion of state-court jurisdiction must satisfy the
International Shoe standard.).
93  Id. at 207.  Although the Court then proceeded to focus on the application of
the minimum contacts test to the assertion of quasi in rem Type 2 jurisdiction, that
focus arose not only from the fact that Shaffer itself involved quasi in rem Type 2
jurisdiction, but also from the Courts judgment that acceptance of the International
Shoe test would most affect this class of cases.  Id. at 209.
94  It is not self-evident that the statements concerning these types of in rem
jurisdiction should be viewed as dictum.  See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III,
142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2040 (1994) (arguing that the distinction between holding
and dictum should turn on the rationale articulated by the court, rather than simply
on facts and outcomes).
95  It is a truism that dictum does not constitute binding precedent.  As Chief
Justice Marshall stated in Cohens v. Virginia, general expressions, in every opinion,
are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used.  If
they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the
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The CNN court acknowledged that there is language in Shaffer that
could be read to require that all in rem cases conform to the same due process
constraints as in personam cases, but asserted that the greater weight of (and
more persuasive) authority holds that the language of Shaffer requires
minimum contacts only for quasi in rem II-type cases.96  The authorities
referred to, however, are either inapposite or erroneous.  For example, the
court cites Justice Scalias opinion in Burnham v. Superior Court,97 a case in
which the Court upheld a state courts assertion of in personam jurisdiction
over a defendant who was personally served with process while physically
present in the forum state.  In the portion of the Burnham opinion cited by
the CNN court, Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Kennedy) argued that the Shoe minimum contacts analysis need not be
applied to the Burnham defendant, and distinguished Shaffer on the basis that
it involved an absent defendant, rather than one who is physically present
within the forum state at the time of service of process: The logic of
Shaffers holdingwhich places all suits against absent defendants on the same
constitutional footing, regardless of whether a separate Latin label is
attached to one particular basis of contactdoes not compel the conclusion
that physically present defendants must be treated identically to absent
ones.98  Notably, Justice Scalias description of Shaffers logic actually
supports S h a f f e r s application to all suits against absent
defendantsincluding ACPA in rem actions.  It is true that Justice Scalia also
argued that the result in Burnham should turn on the historical pedigree of
tag jurisdiction; as Justice Scalia noted, this reliance on tradition
                                                                                                                       
judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision. Cohens
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 399 (1821). Nonetheless, although the precise standard varies
from circuit to circuit, the lower federal courts customarily accord substantial weight
to Supreme Court dictum, particularly when that dictum was carefully considered by
the Court.  See, e.g., City of Timber Lake v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 10 F.3d 554, 557
(8th Cir. 1994); Guidry v. Sheet Metal Wkrs. Intl Assoc., Local No. 9, 10 F.3d 700, 706 n.3
(10th Cir. 1993) (If [Supreme Court] dicta had clearly resolved the issue in this appeal
we would be bound by that decision.); McCoy v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991) ([F]ederal appellate courts are bound by the Supreme
Courts considered dicta almost as firmly as by the Courts outright holdings,
particularly when . . . a dictum is of recent vintage and not enfeebled by any
subsequent statement.); Nichol v. Pullman Standard, Inc., 889 F.2d 115, 120 n.8 (7th Cir.
1989) (Court of Appeals should respect considered Supreme Court dicta); United
States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d 482, 486 (9th Cir. 1983) (in banc) (The Supreme Court
cannot limit its constitutional adjudication to the narrow facts before it in a
particular case.  In the decision of individual cases the Court must and regularly does
establish guidelines to govern a variety of situations related to that presented in the
present case.  The system could not function if lower courts were free to disregard
such guidelines whenever they did not precisely match the facts of the case in which
they were announced.); Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 707 (6th Cir. 1974) (Even the
Courts dicta is [sic] of persuasive precedential value.); Fouts v. Maryland Casualty
Co., 30 F.2d 357, 359 (4th Cir. 1929) ([D]icta of the United States Supreme Court
should be very persuasive.); cf. United States v. Bell, 524 F.2d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 1975)
(stating that considered or judicial dictum where the Court . . . is providing a
construction of a statute to guide the future conduct of inferior courts, though not
binding, must be given considerable weight).
96  Cable News Network, 2001 WL at *4.
97   495 U.S. 604 (1990).
98  Burnham, 495 U.S. at 621.
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contradicts the Courts approach in Shaffer, which applied minimum contacts
analysis to in rem jurisdiction despite its ancient form[].99  Justice Scalias
reasoning in Burnham, however, would not validate the use of the ACPAs in
rem procedure; as Justice Scalia acknowledged, [f]or new procedures,
hitherto unknown, the due process inquiry is guided by International Shoe.100
Although in rem jurisdiction has a long historical pedigree, the same cannot
be said of the application of in rem jurisdiction to Internet domain names.
Rather, because the ACPAs attempt to use domain names and Internet
contacts as a basis for jurisdiction is an indisputably modern construct,
Justice Scalias appeal to tradition in Burnham would provide no support for
the constitutionality of the ACPAs in rem provisions.  (In any event, no part
of Justice Scalias Burnham opinion commanded a majority of the Justices.)
Of the other authorities cited by the CNN court, the only sources
that directly support CNNs holding101 are one district court case and one law
                                                      
99  Burnham, 495 U.S. at 622.
100  Id. at 622.
101  The CNN court cites four other authorities which are inapposite.
In Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de
Navigation, 605 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1979), the court upheld the assertion of
quasi in rem Type 1 jurisdiction because the attached funds were payments
that the plaintiff had made to the defendant with respect to the contract at
issue in the case, and the payments were in the relevant New York bank
account pursuant to the contract, see id. at 655.  The court also noted that
there was no indication the defendant would be amenable to suit anywhere
else in the world, and thus the doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity supported
the exercise of jurisdiction.  See id.  Finally, the court reasoned that
jurisdiction by attachment of property should be accorded special deference
in the admiralty context.  Id.  (Issues concerning jurisdiction by necessity are
discussed below, see infra text accompanying notes     -    .)
In Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1980)a
case involving the assertion of in personam jurisdictionthe Tenth Circuit held
that Shaffer did not undermine the holding of Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).  In Perkins, the Court had held that a
corporation that carries on continuous and systematic activities within a
state can be sued in the courts of that state on a claim unrelated to the
corporations in-state activities.  See Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447-48.  Far from
being at odds with the Shoe requirement of minimum contacts, Perkins
articulates the nature of that requirement in cases of general (as opposed to
specific) jurisdiction.  Shaffers statement that the Shoe analysis governs all
state-court assertions of jurisdiction does not undermine Perkins, which
specifies how the Shoe analysis applies in cases of general jurisdiction.  Thus,
the courts statement in Schreiber that Shaffer is distinguishable, Schreiber,
611 F.2d at 793, is both correct and utterly irrelevant to the question
presented by the ACPA.
In John N. John, Jr., Inc. v. Brahma Petroleum Corp., 699 F. Supp.2d
1220 (W.D. La. 1988), the court found Shaffer inapposable because the
property attached is the very subject of the cause of action, id. at 1222.  Since
the property in question was tangible and was shipped into the jurisdiction
by the plaintiff on behalf of the defendant, see id. at 1220, the propertys
presence within the forum might well be seen to provide contacts between
the defendant and the forum.  Moreover, the court found that sufficient
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review article.  In Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-palace.com,102 the court rejected
the argument that the minimum contacts requirement applies to the
assertion of in rem jurisdiction under the ACPA, reasoning that Shaffer is
limited to cases in which the cause of action is unrelated to the property
which is located in the forum state.103  This argument, which is merely a
restatement of the Shaffer as dictum argument, fails for the reasons
discussed above.  The law review article, likewise, relies mainly on the
contention that Justice Scalias Burnham opinion weakens the force of
Shaffer104an assertion which, as noted, is unpersuasive.
There remain two possible arguments not yet advanced by the courts
that have rejected Shaffers application to ACPA cases: first, that Shaffer by
its terms applies only to assertions of jurisdiction by state, not federal courts,
and second, that, even if Shaffer ordinarily would require minimum contacts
for ACPA in rem suits, such suits should be allowed to proceed under the
doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity.  Neither argument, however, is likely to
succeed.  Admittedly, the limitations imposed by the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment on the exercise of territorial jurisdiction by federal
courts differ in some respects from the limitations imposed on state courts
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  For instance,
as noted above,105 it appears likely that the Fifth Amendment due process
analysis can in appropriate cases look to an absent defendants contacts with
the United States as a whole, rather than just to the defendants contacts
with the state in which the federal court sits.  However, in other respects the
doctrines of federal court territorial jurisdiction draw heavily upon the due
process analysis developed under the Fourteenth Amendment; and though
the Shaffer Court referred only to state court jurisdiction, the logic of the
opinion supports a similar analysis with respect to federal court jurisdiction
                                                                                                                       
contacts existed because the defendant had purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the state, by contracting to do
business within the state.  Id. at 1222.
Finally, the CNN court cites a law review article that proposes a
new constitutional test for personal jurisdiction.  See Walter W. Heiser, A
Minimum Interest Approach to Personal Jurisdiction, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
915, 915 (2000).
102  112 F. Supp.2d 502 (E.D. Va. 2000).
103  Id. at 504.  Despite its assertion that it is unnecessary for
minimum contacts to meet personal jurisdiction standards, the Caesars
World court proceeded to address the question of minimum contacts, and
concluded that the fact of domain name registration with Network
Solutions, Inc., in Virginia supplies such contacts.  Id. at 504.
104  See Thomas R. Lee, In Rem Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 75 WASH. L.
REV. 97, 137-40 (2000).  Lee also seems to suggest that Shaffer itself does not
require minimum contacts analysis in in rem or quasi in rem Type 1
proceedings, see id. at 141-42, and asserts that in any event the registration of a
domain name with NSI in Herndon, Virginia provides the requisite
minimum contacts for an ACPA suit, see id. at 142-43.
105  See supra note    .
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as well.  Accordingly, Shaffers requirement that the defendant have
minimum contacts with the forum should apply equally to federal court
assertions of in rem jurisdiction under the ACPA (although the minimum
contacts analysis would focus on the registrants contacts with the United
States as a whole).  Nor does the doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity validate
the ACPAs in rem provision.  That doctrine has been argued to support a
courts exercise of jurisdiction over defendants, despite the defendants lack
of minimum contacts with the forum, if no other court would have territorial
jurisdiction over the defendants.  For example, the Court in Shaffer noted,
but did not consider, whether the presence of a defendants property in a
State is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction when no other forum is available to
the plaintiff.106  The Court has subsequently indicated, however, that such a
theory is unavailable in cases where the defendant is subject to suit in a
foreign court.107  The courts of the country where a domain name registrant
is located presumably will have territorial jurisdiction over claims against that
registrant.108  Moreover, domain name registrants are subject to non-judicial
proceedings under ICANNs Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution
Policy, and those proceedings provide the same remedies to a successful
claimant as would the ACPAs in rem provisions.  Accordingly, the doctrine
of jurisdiction by necessity seems unlikely to validate those provisions.
In sum, contacts between a registrant and the United States will
suffice for in rem jurisdiction only if the contacts are extensive enough to
support in personam jurisdiction as well.  If the requisite minimum contacts
exist, in personam jurisdiction will (as discussed above) be available, and thus
§ 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I) will not apply.  As a result, the only cases in which
§ 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I) provides a basis for in rem jurisdiction are those in which
the exercise of jurisdiction would violate due process.  Once the courts
recognize this constitutional problem, the ACPAs in rem provision will be of
no use to a mark owner seeking to sue a foreign domain name registrant who
lacks minimum contacts with the United States.  Indeed, the provision
already is of little use, as evidenced by the fact that most mark owners choose
to proceed under the ICANN Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution
Policy instead of suing in federal court under the ACPA.  Thus, the
                                                      
106  Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 211 n.37.
107  In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408
(1984), the Court rejected the plaintiffs jurisdiction by necessity argument on
the ground that the plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of showing that all
three defendants could not be sued together in a single forum . . . . for
example, . . . in either Colombia or Peru, id. at 419 n.13.
108  Admittedly, the fact that a foreign court would have territorial
jurisdiction over the registrant does not mean that the foreign court would
also have subject matter jurisdiction over an ACPA claim against that
registrant, or that foreign law would provide any similar remedy.  However,
these questions are academic, because the availability of the UDRP
procedures (discussed in the text) should remove any argument that
jurisdiction by necessity validates the ACPAs in rem provisions.
[     Realspace Sovereigns in Cyberspace: Draft of October 25, 2001    ]
  23 
significance of the in rem provision lies mainly in Congresss aggressive
assertion of jurisdiction over domain name disputes involving foreign
registrants, and in Congresss attempt to ground the exercise of jurisdiction
in the purported presence of the domain name within the United States.
The assertion that the domain name is located within the U.S. in turn
depends on the location of the dealer or administrator within the U.S.
Similarly, as we discuss below, the strength of the U.S.s claim to prescriptive
jurisdiction over international domain name disputes depends largely on the
present geographical location of the registry in charge of administering the
key top-level domains.  But while the in rem provisions use of dealer and
administrator locations is of conceptual rather than practical interest (since
the in rem provision is unconstitutional anyway), the significance of
geography in the prescriptive jurisdiction analysis has real-world
consequences.
III
Nam ing Ju risdiction:
Rea lspace  Sover eigns & Doma in Nam es
For the balance of this paper, we turn from the adjudicative to the
legislative, and from the constitutional to the strategic.  In this section we
consider the implications of the present far-reaching Congressional approach
to legislative jurisdiction over domain name disputes, noting that such a U.S.-
centric view may not in the long term be in the interests of either the global
electronic commerce community as a whole, or the U.S. participants in this
new economic structure in particular.
A
Dis tribut ed  Hie rarchy : the  Contro l  of  D omain  Names
As presently constituted,109 the domain name system110 is nothing
more (and nothing less) than a distributed hierarchical database  a simple
list of names and their corresponding IP addresses.111  That is, no single
                                                      
109 circa Fall 2001.
110 Well assume here that readers have a working understanding of the domain
name system  at least enough to it use in the ordinary course of web-browsing, for
example.  Brief, non-technical introductions to the domain name system can be
found in a variety of places, both online and off.  See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin & R.
Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1303 (1999); Diane Cabell, Name Conflicts, LEARNING
CYBERLAW IN CYBERSPACE (1999), http://www.cyberspacelaw.org/cabell/index.html.
111 Internet communications are packet-based, meaning that transmissions are
separated into small data units, wrapped in addressing (and other) information, and
sent across the Internet.  In order to reach their destination, packets must be
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computer contains the entire database; the computers that do contain the
database (called DNS servers) are located in myriad locations (both
physically and logically) worldwide.  Yet the hierarchical nature of the system
means that some parts of the database are more important than others.  To
illustrate this point, well consider the system as having three distinct levels:
the root level, the TLD level, and the user level, as shown in Figure 1.
F ig u re 1 :  D omai n  Name  Hiera rchy
The user DNS servers are those that serve individual groups of
users/machines  subscribers to a particular ISP, for example, or those within
a corporate or university network.  That is, the user DNS servers for the
University of Pennsylvania contain the addressing information for the
machines relating to upenn.edu (Penns assigned domain name), as well as
serve DNS queries sent by these machines.112  The TLD Servers hold the
addressing information for the user DNS servers about an entire top-level-
domain  here, the .edu TLD server would contain (among others) the
addressing information for the upenn.edu DNS server.113  And the root
servers hold addressing information relating to the TLD servers; for
                                                                                                                       
addressed with the appropriate IP address  a unique number corresponding to
each machine connected to the Internet.  When an Internet user requests a page
using a domain name (say, for example, www.yahoo.com, the domain name system
provides the correct IP address.
112 For example, the IP address for the machine with the name law.upenn.edu  is
130.91.144.200.  This information is maintained by the Penn DNS servers, the
primary one of which is located at 128.91.254.4.
113 This information is easily found by conducting a whois query on the
appropriate database.  A web-based user interface to one such database can be found
at http://www.netsol.com/cgi-bin/whois/whois.  The whois record for upenn.edu
contains the following DNS data:
Domain servers in listed order:
noc3.dccs.upenn.edu 128.91.254.4
noc2.dccs.upenn.edu 128.91.254.1
dns1.udel.edu 128.175.13.16
dns2.udel.edu 128.175.13.17
TLD  Serve rs
Use r DNS Servers
Roo t Serv ers
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example, the location of the .edu TLD server.114  Because DNS requests for
out-of-network resources (say a user in the Penn network requests the
address corresponding to www.yahoo.com) will in theory115 require requests to
each level of the DNS system described above, it becomes apparent that the
hierarchy of the system determines the amount of requests to which the
various servers must respond.  That is, the .edu TLD server will (absent
caching) be involved in all out-of-network requests involving  the .edu
domain, and the root server will be involved in essentially all DNS requests.
This distributed hierarchy, then, has unquestionable regulatory
significance: involvement in DNS requests means an ability to exert power,
at least over the next higher (in our Figure 1) DNS level.  Indeed, the
regulatory significance of the DNS hierarchy is what the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the present
administrator of the public root server system, uses to ensure universal
adoption of the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP)  because
ICANN controls the root servers, it determines the status of the TLD
servers. Further, by requiring any applicant desiring to administer a TLD to
agree to require its domain name registrants to either agree to the provisions
of the UDRP, or gain approval for any alterations from the UDRP, ICANN
can essentially exert full regulatory control over the domain name system.116
                                                      
114 As of October 2001, the TLD servers for .edu were:
a.root-servers.net.
h.root-servers.net.
c.root-servers.net.
g.root-servers.net.
f.root-servers.net.
b.root-servers.net.
i.root-servers.net.
e.root-servers.net.
d.root-servers.net.
115 As a practical matter, local DNS servers often cache recent requests.
116 S e e ICANN, New TLD Application Process Overview § (August 3 2000)
(http://www.icann.org/tlds/application-process-03aug00.htm)(For unsponsored
TLDs, ICANN will have policy-formulation responsibility for the new TLD and the
policies will initially be generally defined as the existing policies for .com, .net, and
.org . . . . .).  Of course ICANN can (and does) delegate some policymaking
authority to TLD operators, most prominently in the case of sponsored TLD 
where the sponsoring organization is delegated some range of policymaking
authority.  See ICANN, New TLD Program (2001) (http://www.icann.org/tlds/)
(Generally speaking, an "unsponsored" TLD operates under policies established by
the global Internet community directly through the ICANN process, while a
"sponsored" TLD is a specialized TLD that has a sponsor representing the narrower
community that is most affected by the TLD. The sponsor thus carries out delegated
policy-formulation responsibilities over many matters concerning the TLD.).
Nonetheless, the control (provided by administration of the root server system) is
there.
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B
Map ping  C ontrol :  Geog raphy and  th e  Doma in  Name Syst em
Thus far we have described what might be called logical control
over the domain name system: the technological ability to exert power by
virtue of administration of the important components of the DNS system.117
And yet while this alone raises a number of interesting questions,118 we want
to raise a slightly different set of issues: those surrounding the realspace
sovereigns approach to regulation of the domain name system.
Here, we want to point out that the domain name system
unquestionably exists in realspace.  It is merely a collection of computer
hardware and software (and people who administer and maintain them); each
of these constituent components is real in any sense of the word, and can
be found at various geographic points throughout the world.  As such, it is
possible to map the domain name system onto realspace, where concepts like
borders and sovereignty are crucially important (at least from a regulatory
perspective).
For example, we noted above that the primary root server, named
a.root-servers.net, is administered by ICANN.  A simple web query reveals
that machine is physically located within the United States, in the city of
Herndon, Virginia.119  That machine also serves as the .edu TLD server.120
The primary user DNS server for upenn.edu, named noc3.dccs.upenn.edu, is
located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania  as expected.121
It follows, then, that if the distributed hierarchy of the domain name
system has logical regulatory significance, and this hierarchy is mapped onto
realspace, the geography of the domain name system has what might be
called  territorial regulatory significance.  It is to the implications of this
territorial regulatory significance that we now turn.
                                                      
117 This general view  the correlation between control over technology and
policymaking  is a common theme in recent cyberlaw scholarship.  For an
excellent overview, see Lessig, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
118 In particular we note the many issues that surround the establishment of
ICANN as the authoritative body for the present public root server system.
Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 Duke L.J. 187 (2000);
Milton Mueller, ICANN and Internet Governance: Sorting through the debris of self-
regulation. INFO 1, 6, 477-500, December 1999.  See also the excellent materials
relating to ICANN collected by ICANN Watch, a watchdog organization, at
http://www.icannwatch.org/ [more cites]
119 NetGeo Query, found at http://netgeo.caida.org/perl/netgeo.cgi.  The results
also noted the approximate latitude and longitude as 38.98 / -77.39.
120 See supra note __.  The other major TLD servers  those for the .com, .org, and
.net TLDs  are also located near Herndon, Virginia  Dulles, to be exact.  Each of
these TLDs has as its primary DNS server the machine designated a.gtld-servers.net.
See IANA, .com Top-Level Domain, Root-Zone Whois Information,
http://www.iana.org/root-whois/com.htm, See IANA, .net Top-Level Domain, Root-
Zone Whois Information, http://www.iana.org/root-whois/net.htm, See IANA, .org
Top-Level Domain, Root-Zone Whois Information, http://www.iana.org/root-
whois/org.htm.
121 Latitude 39.96, longitude 75.20.
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C
The  Signi ficanc e  of  T errito rial  Regulat ion
This territorial significance  that the geographic location of certain
important components of the domain name system will have implications for
the regulation of the system  plays out in at least two ways.  First, as an
international legal matter, the geographic location of the domain names
system may be widely recognized as supporting a strong claim to prescriptive
(or legislative) jurisdiction over various disputes that arise relating to the
system.  Second, even if a prescriptive jurisdictional claim is not widely
recognized according to accepted principles, the geographic location of the
domain name system may nonetheless determine whether (and to what
extent) realspace sovereigns can regulate the system.  Yet this point -- that
the geography of the domain name system will to a large degree determine
the scope of regulatory authority available to realspace sovereigns -- must be
considered in the context of the essentially arbitrary nature of the present
geographic facts of the system.  That is, while the logical regulatory
significance of the hierarchy of the domain name system is inherent in the
technology, the geography is not.  Put simply, the root servers could move,
taking with them the territorial regulatory significance.  Furthermore, a
realspace sovereign122 set on increasing the present regulatory authority
available to itself  either recognized or de facto  could itself alter the
geographic facts, by creating additional root servers and requiring their use.
Recognition of this requires, we think, a widespread reconsideration of the
aims of present regulation of the domain name system by realspace
sovereigns, in particular the United States approach embodied in the ACPA.
We take up this final point in Section __ below, while first discussing the
dual implications of territoriality and the domain name system.
1
Recognized Authority:  Prescriptive Juri sdiction & Domain
Names
We turn first (and briefly) to the significance of prescriptive
jurisdictional claims.123
                                                      
122 Or set of sovereigns, of course.  For example, a group of sovereigns, perhaps
organized regionally or culturally, might establish and mandate its own root server
system, with shared or delegated policy authority.
123 As will become quickly apparent to the reader, this subsection is not intended
as a comprehensive description of the issues surrounding prescriptive jurisdiction.
Rather, our goal here is to provide context to support our argument that the
geography of the domain system will have realspace regulatory implications.
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a
The Principles of Prescriptive Jurisdiction
As a general matter, international law recognizes at least three, and as
many as five bases of prescriptive jurisdiction.124  The most widely accepted
principles relevant to our discussion125 are those of:
territoriality;126 and,
nationality.127
Territoriality refers to the notion that a sovereign state has a claim
to prescribe conduct within its physical territory,128  and the status of
persons, or interests in things, present within its territory.129   This basis for
jurisdiction includes the related effects principle, which extends the basic
claim to include conduct outside [the states] territory that has or is
intended to have substantial effect within its territory. 130  Although some
commentators have suggested that the territorial principle should be the
complete basis for analyzing prescriptive jurisdiction131, the modern view
                                                      
124 We use the terms legislative jurisdiction and prescriptive jurisdiction
interchangeably here, given the context in which we write: the analysis of the scope
of Congressional authority to legislate on the matter of domain names.  See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, THIRD, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, § 401(a) [hereafter, RESTATEMENT].
125 As we note below in notes __ and accompanying text, there are several other
recognized principles of prescriptive jurisdiction; none of which seem likely to be
relevant in the context of the dispute over domain names.
126 RESTATEMENT § 402(1), Barry Carter & Philip Trimble, INTERNATIONAL LAW
728, 729-733 (2nd ed., 19__) [hereafter, Carter & Trimble ]
127 RESTATEMENT § 402(2), Carter & Trimble, 728,
128 It is an essential attribute of the sovereignty of this realm, as of all sovereign
independent States, that it should possess jurisdiction over al persons and things
within its territorial limits and in all causes civil and criminal arising within these
limits.  J. Starke, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW  194 (9th ed. 1984)
(quoting Lord Macmillan).
Mark Janis suggests that the treaties concerning the Peace of Westphalia of 1648
established the principles of the territorial sovereignty and the jurisdiction of states
have been two of the most fundamental principles of international law.  Janis,
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW (2nd ed., 19 __).
129 RESTATEMENT 402(1)(b).
130 RESTATEMENT 402(1)(c). See also United States v. Aluminum Company of
America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2nd Cir. 1945) ([A]ny state may impose liabilities, even
upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has
consequences within its borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities
other states will ordinarily recognize.); Starke, 195; Carter & Trimble, 738 ([I]n the
past few decades, U.S. law enforcement agencies and U.S. Courts have increasingly
applied U.S. law extraterritoriality, that is, to persons acting abroad, when their acts
have a substantial effects on the United States.);
131 [T]he character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by
the law of the country where the act is done. . . .  For another jurisdiction, if it should
happen to lay hold of the actor, to treat him according to its own notions rather than
those of the place where he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but would be an
interference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of
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recognizes that the territorial principle is both under- and over-inclusive: it
both fails to account for cases in which states have a legitimate claim to
prescriptive jurisdiction, and must yield in certain circumstances to the
extraterritorial principles that have developed to address the under-
inclusiveness (including, indeed, the effects principle).132
The principle of nationality is also rooted in traditional notions of
state sovereignty, though in this case the sovereignty refers to the states
citizens or subjects, rather than the states physical territory.133  As typically
stated, nationality refers to the right to prescribe the activities, interests,
status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory.134
Note that three other commonly-invoked bases for prescriptive
jurisdiction exist: (a) the protective principle; (b) passive personality principle
; and, (c) the universality principle.  Under the protective principle, a state
may prescribe conduct occurring outside its territory and not performed by
its nationals, if such conduct threatens the security of the state or certain
other special classes of state functions.135  While this basis for jurisdiction is
well-established, the challenge in delimiting the scope of state interests that
may be used to invoke the principle  as well as the self-referential aspects of
any such definition  often leads to controversy over its application.136  Here,
it appears unlikely that it would support the assertion of prescriptive
jurisdiction over domain names.
Passive personality refers to the claim that a state may exercise
jurisdiction whenever one of its citizens is harmed, irrespective of the
                                                                                                                       
nations, which the other state concerned justly might resent. . . . American Banana
Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356-357 (1909) (Holmes, J.).
132 This recognition, however, is not without controversy.  Carter & Trimble note
that application of U.S. antitrust and securities law to acts committed abroad has
sparked resistance from foreign courts, and even the passage of blocking statutes in
various states intended to curtail the extraterritorial reach of U.S. laws.  Carter &
Trimble, 738.  The Restatement addresses this dispute by expressly limiting
prescriptive jurisdiction according to a standard of reasonableness.  RESTATEMENT §
403.  See also notes __ and accompanying text.
133 See, e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (Nor can it be doubted
that the United States possesses the power inherent in sovereignty to require the
return to this country of a citizen, resident elsewhere, whenever the public interest
requires it, and to penalize him in the case of refusal.);
134 RESTATEMENT 402(2).
135 RESTATEMENT 402(3).  The special classes of state functions are usually taken
to support jurisdiction over subject such as espionage, counterfeiting of the state's
seal or currency, falsification of official documents, as well as perjury before consular
officials, and conspiracy to violate the immigration or customs laws. See Restatement
402, comment f.
136 To take one example, the protective principle has been used to uphold the right
of the United States to prosecute foreign nationals on foreign vessels on the high
seas for possession of narcotics.  United States v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d 1147 (11th
Cir. 1985).  Starke notes that while the grounds for the protective principle presume
that the offenses subject to its application are (1) of utmost gravity to the state and
(2) may escape punishment altogether, absent the assertion of jurisdiction, the fact
that each state has the latitude to determine what conduct implicates important
state functions means that the application of the protective principle can be quite
arbitrary.
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location of the dispute or the identity of the harmed.137  This claim is not
widely recognized beyond circumstances involving international terrorism
and other serious crimes, however,138 and well not discuss it further here.
Similarly, the universality principle recognizes that some crimes  usually
limited to those offenses recognized by the community of nations as of
universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of
aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism  may
be prescribed anywhere.139  Again, this principle is not relevant to our
discussion here.
b
Limitations to Prescription
As should be apparent, even confining the discussion to the two most
widely-accepted and relevant bases for prescriptive jurisdiction  territoriality
and nationality  does little to reduce the potential for competing claims
among states.  Accordingly, the claims outlined above must be understood to
be limited in certain respects.  To this end, The Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Affairs sets forth the general United States approach, which is in
essence a two-part test: first, where a competing claim for prescriptive
jurisdiction might exist, the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable;
second, where two states have not unreasonable claims, jurisdiction should
be given to the state with a clearly greater interest in prescription.140
Under the restatement, both the reasonableness of the claim of jurisdiction
and the weighing of the states interests are measured by a non-exclusive set
of eight factors, generally involving the extent and quality of the connection
between the location, the parties, and the states involved  as well as the
character of the dispute itself.141   As applied by the United States, these
limitations are most clearly reflected in canons established for the
construction of statutes that may involve a contested claim of prescriptive
jurisdiction.142  For example, there is the longstanding principle of American
law 'that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.'" 143  Even
                                                      
137 RESTATEMENT 402, comment g.; Starke, 224; Carter & Trimble, 782.
138 RESTATEMENT 402, comment g (The principle has not been generally
accepted for ordinary torts or crimes, but it is increasingly accepted as applied to
terrorist and other organized attacks on a state's nationals by reason of their
nationality, or to assassination of a state's diplomatic representatives or other
officials.); United States v. Columba-Collela, 604 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 1979).
139 RESTATEMENT 404; Carter & Trimble, 788-89; Janis, 329-30.  See also United
States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 161 (1820) (jurisdiction to prescribe piracy), Filartiga v.
Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2nc. Cir. 1980) (jurisdiction to prescribe torture).
140 RESTATEMENT § 403(1), (3).
141 RESTATEMENT § 403(2).
142 E.g., Hartford Fire Insurance v California, 509 U.S. 764, 813-17 (1993) (Scalia, J.
dissenting)
143 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley
Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949))( finding the presumption not overcome
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more significantly, Chief Justice Marshall established the canon that [a]n act
of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any
other possible construction remains.144  Taken together, this analysis seeks
to limit the circumstances where the application of U.S. prescriptive
jurisdiction will run into conflict with the claims of another state, and
explicitly draws in the examination of reasonableness and the respective
strengths of the claims involved.145  Accordingly, courts in the United States
have limited the application of U.S. laws where they determined that to do
otherwise would undermine the interacting interests of the United States
and of foreign countries,146 and otherwise advocated caution when presented
with contesting claims of prescriptive jurisdiction.147
A further, yet related, limitation on the claims underlying
prescriptive jurisdiction noted above is the principle of comity.  Comity
refers to the mutual respect sovereigns offer one another by limiting
application of their laws in certain cases  most commonly where another
nation has a more significant claim to jurisdiction.148  In many ways, the
application of principles of comity parallels the reasonableness inquiry
suggested by the Restatement  at root, they both involve an analysis of the
strength of the sovereign interests.  What comity adds to this analysis is a
                                                                                                                       
in the case of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).  See also Matushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582, n. 6 (1986) (approving the
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act), Continental Ore Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962) (same); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945) (same).
144 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804).
145 See RESTATEMENT § 403.
146 Romero v. Intl Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 383 (1959).  See also
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953), McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963).
147 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2nd Cir. 1945)
([W]e are not to read general words, such as those in [the Sherman] Act, without
regard to the limitations customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their
powers; limitations which generally correspond to those fixed by the 'Conflict of
Laws.'").
148 Comity . . . is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of
mere courtesy and goodwill, upon the other.  But it is the recognition which one
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to
the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protections of its
laws. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1985).
Comity refers to two types of limitations.  First, the limitations that are self-
imposed by the legislature in adopting a statute.  Justice Scalia has termed this sort
of comity prescriptive comity, and notes that courts will assume that this type of
comity has been exercised when evaluating the scope of statutes.  See Hartford Fire,
at 817.  See also Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N. T. & S. A., 549 F.2d
597, 608-615 (9th Cir. 1976); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d
1287, 1294-1298 (3rd Cir. 1979); Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661 F.2d 864,
869-871 (10th Cir. 1981).  The second sort of comity is judicial in nature, a recognition
by a court that the decision in the case is better made elsewhere, or that the decision
must be fashioned in a way that considers foreign interests.  Hartford Fire, 817;
Carter & Trimble, 738.  See also J. Story, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 38 (1834) (distinguishing between the "comity of the courts" and the "comity
of nations," and defining the latter as "the true foundation and extent of the
obligation of the laws of one nation within the territories of another")
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suggestion of flexibility, a sort of subjective consideration of how the
determination of prescriptive jurisdiction  irrespective of the more objective
criteria of reasonableness and clearly greater interests  fits into the wider
context of international legal principles.149
c
Prescribing Domain Names
Having set forth the bases and limitations of the assertion of
prescriptive jurisdiction (especially in the U.S. context), we turn now to how
these bases interact with the geography of the domain name system.  Because
we are especially interested in the United States present regulatory approach
(i.e., the ACPA, especially the in rem provisions150), and because the current
geographic facts of the domain name system are remarkably US-based, this
discussion will necessarily be heavily US-focused. (Note that in the particular
context in which Congress has presently acted  legislating for domain name
disputes as they relate to trademarks151  there will be one or more registered
U.S. Trademarks involved; 152  for purposes of our argument, however, we set
aside the international trademark issues.153)
                                                      
149 Carter & Trimble, 738.Janis, 332-33.
150 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).  The self-styled in rem proceedings are found in
section 1125(d)(2).
151 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
152 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (allowing claims based on infringement of a mark).
Federal Trademarks are registered by application to the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051  1072.
153 It is an understatement to note that the application of trademark law to the
online context presents difficult international law issues.  [ . . . ] As Graeme
Dinwoodie has noted, see Graeme Dinwoodie, Private International Aspects of the
Protection of Trademarks (2001)(WIPO Doc. No. WIPO/PIL/01/4), the continued
expansive interpretation of national trademarks in the online context threatens to
reduce trademark rights to their most destructive form  the mutual ability to
block (or at least interfere with) the online use of marks recognized in other
countries.  Accordingly, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is
expected to approve in fall 2001 a resolution calling for a more flexible recognition of
use of trademarks on the Internet, one that would provide protections from
liability for legitimate users of marks who disclaimed the intent to conduct
commerce in a particular country.  See Standing Committee on the Law of
Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geographical Indications, Protection of Marks,
and Other Industrial Property Rights in Signs, on the Internet (2001) (WIPO Doc.
No. SCT/6/2).
We set aside the issues specific to international application of US trademark law
for several reasons.  Most generally, we consider the truly notable question here to be
Congress approach to the regulation of domain names, especially the self-styled in
rem provisions of the ACPA; in this view, the effects on the international regulation
of trademarks are parasitic on a particular view of domain names as what one of us
has described as a species of mutant trademark.  Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk
Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1303 (1999).  Here, looking beyond the mutant trademark
aspects of domain names allows, we hope, for a more focused consideration of the
challenges facing sovereigns in cyberspace.
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Our analysis suggests that the present form of the domain names
system offers the United States a strong claim of prescriptive jurisdiction
along several dimensions of the analysis.  Maintaining our focus on the bases
of nationality and territoriality, we note the following important factors
involved in this analysis:
Citizenship. The citizenship of the parties to the dispute obviously
invokes the nationality principle, supporting the prescriptive claim for any
corresponding sovereign.
TLD Server Location. Because almost all domain name disputes will
arise in the context of what are known as second-level domain names (the
upenn in the name upenn.edu is the second-level domain name), the most
direct authority over and responsibility for these domain names will rest with
the operation of the relevant TLD Server, thereby supporting the
prescriptive claim of the sovereign in which that server is located.154
Root Server Location.  As noted above, control over the root server
allows at least some level of control over the entire system, though at times
this support will be indirect.155  As such, the geographic location of the root
server will support  though to a lesser degree than the location of the TLD
server  the assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction, based on the principle of
territoriality.
Focusing first on the United States, we note again that the primary
root server (a.root-servers.net) is located within the United States,156 we set
forth our results as follows:
                                                                                                                       
But there are other, more practical, reasons to set aside the international
trademark questions as well.  First, to the extent that such questions turn on the
identity and citizenship of the parties,  see Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co.
Ltd., 234 F.2d 633 (2nd Cir. 1956), we consider that in our analysis.  Second, the
consideration of whether there are conflicting rights to use the mark, see Vanity
Mills, is, in our view, distinct from the question of whether there are (or should be)
legitimate competing claims to use the domain name.  See Dinwoodie, etc.  Third,
whether there are substantial effects in the United States resulting from the use of
a trademark as part of a domain name is (a) similar in nature to the effects analysis
we discuss at note __ below; and (b) likely to be a disputed ground upon which to
determine the scope of prescriptive jurisdiction on the Internet.  See Playboy
Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Pub. Inc., 939 F.Supp 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).  Finally,
the use of trademark law to support legislation pertaining to domain names is likely
to create additional conflicts and controversy is only likely to further buttress our
second point made at notes __ and accompanying text below: that the current US
approach lends incentives for other states to consider supporting the segmenting of
the domain name space.
154 Note that for simplicity, were conflating the location of the actual hardware
(i.e., the machine) that constitutes the TLD server, and the location of the
administrative authority.  We assume, for the purposes of our argument, that the
hardware will typically be in the same country as the administrators / system
operators.
155 See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
156 See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
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cas e cit izensh ip TLD  Serve r Pre script ive  Cla im
1 US US US
2 mix ed US US
3 non -US US US
4 US non -US US
5 mix ed non -US US
6 non -US non -US unc lear
T ab le 1 :  U.S . P rescri p t ive Ju risd ict ion al  C la ims
Cases 1 and 2 are relatively easy: in each, both nationality and
territoriality support the U.S. claim; in Case 2, there is a potential competing
claim based on nationality, but the clear weight of the interests balances in
favor of the U.S.  Case 3 is perhaps more controversial.  If the non-US
citizens are from separate countries, then there are at least three potentially
competing claims. Among the three, we suggest that none will have a clearly
greater interest than the U.S.157  If the non-US citizens are from the same
country, then the relative claim of that country would seem stronger.158  In
Cases 4 and 5, the U.S. claim is supported by nationality, as well as the basis
for territoriality provided by the location of the root server.159  In our view,
the location of the TLD server does not provide a clearly greater claim in
this context, though we admit these cases are close.
Cases 6 has an uncertain result.  Of course, the U.S. would have at
least some support from the principle of territoriality as a consequence of the
location of the root server  though this support would be less, we think,
than the support provided by the location of the TLD server.  Yet that
would be the full extent of the support for the U.S. claim, leading us to
conclude that the U.S. claim is likely (though perhaps not certain) to be
clearly outweighed by a competing claim, especially if the location of the
TLD server and the citizenship of at least one of the parties corresponds.
This exercise leads us to two points.  First, even though the U.S.
Constitution severely limits the impact of the in rem provisions of the
ACPA,160 the U.S. prescriptive jurisdictional claim appears to be quite strong
                                                      
157 Pursuant to the RESTATEMENT, when multiple countries have competing
claims, a clearly greater claim must be recognized. See RESTATEMENT § 403(3).  See
also supra notes __ and accompanying text.
158 See, e.g., Heathmount v. Technodome.com, 106 F. Supp.2d 860 (E.D. Va.2000)
(ACPA action between Canadian citizens).  The court in Heathmount did not address
this issue.
159 Note that the analysis of the effects of domain name activity is likely to
approximate a wash in cases where the DNS system is available worldwide.  That is,
the effects of a domain name in the United States is likely to be similar to the effects
of the same domain name in another country; both states might be able to note the
effects in their territory, but it seems unlikely that either effect would be clearly
greater than the other.
160 As we analyzed in section __ above, these in rem provisions, found in 15 U.S.C. §
1125(d)(2) apply to cases of anonymous registrants and cases involving registrants
lacking minimum contacts with the United States.  In the latter cases, as we discuss
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generally.  Second, as far as recognizable claims of prescriptive jurisdiction
goes, geography matters: the physical location of the TLD and root servers
play a crucial role in evaluating potentially competing claims of prescriptive
jurisdiction.  Here, the geographic fact that the root servers (at least the
primary one and its administration), as well as the most populated TLD
servers,  are geographically located within the United States, grants the
United States a considerable amount of regulatory latitude.  And while the
U.S. government has, we think, a limited ability to exercise jurisdiction over
domain name disputes, other sovereigns may not be so limited.161  As we note
below, this insight has substantial implications.
2
De Facto  Regulatory Significance
Even if a particular sovereigns claims for prescriptive jurisdiction are
unrecognized under international legal principles, we note that the geography
of the domain name system can nonetheless provide substantial regulatory
leverage.  This de facto regulatory significance flows, like the recognized
form, from the distributed hierarchy of the domain name system.  To the
extent that elements of the domain name system are under a sovereigns
potential physical control  typically by being located (geographically) within
the sovereigns territory  a sovereign can exercise control.  For example,
because the administration of the root server offers logical control over the
entire domain name system,162 sovereign control over the root server would
then allow de facto control over the domain name system.
For example, consider the case of the United States, under the
present geographic and technical facts of the domain name system.163  In
principle, Congress could pass laws (or an agency could issue regulations)
directed to the public root server system.  Perhaps these laws might specify
the standards by which TLDs would get access to the root servers, or even
specify the TLDs and their policies themselves.  These laws might give
preferences to U.S. companies and individuals in domain name disputes,
charge taxes on any entity using a domain name, or specify the types of uses
that domain names can be put to.164  By controlling the root server, the U.S.
                                                                                                                       
above, the assertion of in rem jurisdiction over the domain name will violate due
process.
161 Assuming the same level of geographic connections to the critical features of
the domain name system.  As we note below, sovereigns can also take steps to alter
the geographic facts in their favor.
162 At least over the domain name system utilizing that root server.  As we noted
above, this is how ICANN presently exerts nearly complete policy control over the
domain name system.  See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
163 See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
164 Obviously, the U.S. Constitution would provide an important limit to such
regulations, especially those that might implicate rights of free expression.  See, e.g.,
U.S. Const. amend. 1.  Note, however, that such constraints would not necessarily
restrict similar actions by other sovereigns.
[     Realspace Sovereigns in Cyberspace: Draft of October 25, 2001    ]
  36 
government could effectively control the TLD servers  by threatening
banishment from the public root server system and the concomitant loss of
operation.  And by controlling the TLD servers, the U.S. government could
exercise de facto control over the entire range of second-level domain names
available in the public root server system.
There is no evidence at all, we think, that the United States
government is planning any activities of this sort.165  Nor, of course, are we
advocating such a course, as we argue in some detail below.  At present, even
the most aggressive assertion of jurisdiction we describe here  the in rem
provisions of the ACPA -- falls well short of the sort of widespread de facto
control set forth above.  And yet the point we noted above remains:
geography matters.  Put simply, control over the domain name system -- both
recognized and de facto  is remarkably correlated with geographic facts.
This, we think, has considerable implications for the future of the domain
name system.
IV
The  Cruci al Rol e of Realspa ce Sov ereign s
Thus far, weve analyzed the aspects of logical and territorial control
over the domain name system, arguing that in the context of realspace
sovereigns, the mapping of the logical control structure onto the physical
world results in a regulatory hierarchy of sorts  with those states that have
critical components of the domain name system located within their territory
having potentially great regulatory leverage over the system as a whole.  This
argument also leads to two other important observations.  First, we note that
the geographic facts of the domain name system are both essentially arbitrary
and uniquely mutable attributes,166 thereby providing realspace sovereigns
with an important hook to attempt to alter the geographic facts in their
favor.  Second, and following from the first, we argue that the likely result of
greater regulatory activism by various realspace sovereigns will be the
segmentation of the domain name system, and the dramatic reduction in
utility provided by the system itself.
A
Geo graphi c  Alte ration :  The Virtua l  Land  Grab
                                                      
165 Cite the White Paper, Memorandum of Understanding.
166 Note that we do not suggest that that realspace geography (territoriality)
doesnt matter on the Internet generally.  It is becoming increasingly obvious that
geography is both ascertainable and important online.  [cites to NetGeo, Packeteer,
Akamai, Yahoo! France ].  Instead, the suggestion is that, given the distributed
hierarchical nature of the DNS, the geographic location of the A root servers is not
especially relevant to the operation of the system.  See supra note 30.
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Say that Country X decides that the present quasi-U.S. approach to
the regulation of the domain names system is not in its interest.  Perhaps this
country is troubled by the present strong protection of commercial
trademarks embedded in both the ICANN-mandated policies and the
ACPA.167  Or perhaps Country X is disagrees with the principles of free
expression that have been held to extend to domain name disputes.168  Or
Country X might simply see the domain name system as a potential source of
revenue.169
Whatever the reason, it is clear that Country X would have
substantial ability to at least attempt to alter the geographic facts.  Country
X  could establish a root server system of its own, and mandate that local
networks use the official root server.170  In a fairly benign form of this
virtual land grab, the Country X root server might mirror or link to the
existing public root server system, and merely offer additional TLDs.171
Country X would be able to exert regulatory control over the additional
TLDs, while the remaining TLDs would be unaffected and remain available
to Country X users.  A more troubling arrangement would be if Country X
limited, reassigned the TLDs available in the new root server, or otherwise
created conflicts between its root server and the public server.  This second
set of circumstances creates the (great, we think) potential for the
segmentation of the worldwide domain name system, and the dramatic
reduction in the value of the system.
B
Seg mentin g  Doma in  Names
As we use it here, the domain name system becomes segmented
when: (1) the same DNS requests sent by users in different networks yield
different results; or (2) some number of TLDs are unavailable to users,
depending upon the root server system they use.  Both of these
circumstances arise when different root server systems are used  though the
existence and use of different root servers is a necessary but not a sufficient
                                                      
167 See supra notes __ and accompanying text.  See also Froomkin, etc.
168 See, e.g.,
169 See, e.g., Anna Soderblom, Island Joins the Dots and Will Net Fortune, THE TIMES
(LONDON), Nov. 6, 2000 (noting that the island nation of Tuvalu expects to net over
$50 million from registrations in the .tv TLD space, or about three times Tuvalu's
gross domestic product.).  The Tuvalu case is slightly different than what we suggest
here, of course, as Tuvalu controls only the .tv TLD, rather than the root server.
170 Alternatively, the regulations could identify a private alternative root server
system  perhaps as part of a wider agreement involving policies, taxation, etc.  Such
alternative root server systems, as we discuss at notes __ and accompanying text
below, already exist.  See, e.g., New.net, Mission Statement (2001) at
http://www.new.net/about_us_mission.tp
171 This type of arrangement has been described as a virtual inclusive root.  See S.
Higgs, Root Zone Definitions, INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE (Internet Draft)
(May 2001).
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condition.172  Segmentation arises when the various root server systems in use
are either in conflict, or do not accurately reflect the content of other root
servers.  For example, the official Country X Root Server might send
requests for the .com TLD to a different server than the ICANN a.root-
servers.net, thereby creating a conflict  resulting in, for example, a request for
www.yahoo.com to yield a different web page in different networks.173  Or the
Country X Root Server might ignore requests for the .com TLD altogether,
rendering a large part of the domain name system unusable (for its users).  An
even more likely case is that any additional TLDs established by Country X
may not be recognized by the public root server system, thereby making
them unavailable to the Internet user community at large.174
We predict that segmentation would result under the following
circumstances:
First, a new root server system (formed or mandated by a sovereigns
regulatory activity) could create conflicts with the existing public root server
system.  As noted above, these conflicts could result in unexpected behavior
or the inability for certain segments of the global Internet to utilize TLDs
publicly available elsewhere.
Second, and perhaps even more importantly, segmentation must be
considered a potential response by one or more sovereigns to any others
attempts to exert unwanted regulatory influence over the domain name
system.  For example, if Country X established its own root server system,
and established policies for expanded TLDs that were in conflict with the
policies of Country Y, a potential response for Country Y would be to
responsively create (or mandate) a root server system that effectively
blocked the Country X TLDs.  Lest this possibility seem farfetched,
consider Chinas recent suggestion that it would take steps to ensure that it
controlled the distribution and administration of all Chinese-character
domain names  a task that certainly implicates the creation of alternative
root server systems (or the threat thereof).175
                                                      
172 As noted in Higgs Root Zone Definitions, multiple root server systems presently
exist with little, if any, problems for the system.  See supra note __.  Higgs in
particular describes private root server systems, which are not publicly available
and are intended to serve only a single network, as well as inclusive root servers,
which expand the TLDs available on the standard root server system.  Id.
173 This would not necessarily be the case, of course.  Depending upon the details
of Country Xs redistribution plan, it seems entirely possible that Yahoo!, Inc. might
purchase the rights to yahoo.com in the County X Root Server zone.
174 Note that we distinguish here between what we call segmentation of the
domain name system and the present use and availability of alternative or
inclusive root server systems.  The major (in terms of numbers of users) alternative
root server systems differ from the hypothetical segmented system we outline above
because they explicitly include the information provided by the public root server
system, and because they are created by and backed with market forces, not
sovereign government regulatory action.  We recognize that such alternative root
server systems may stimulate much-needed innovation and competition in the field
of domain name administration, yet note that the increasing popularity of such
services is only increasing the chances that true segmentation develops.
175 See, e.g., Rachel Ross, China Demands Jurisdiction Over Domain Names In
Chinese, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 13, 2000 (We think that as 97.5 per cent of the
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As should be easily apparent, segmentation of the domain name
system would dramatically decrease its value to the Internet user
community.176  As a means of searching and selecting online resources, the
domain name systems value is directly related to its scope; its value is at its
highest when the system includes all named online resources.  Importantly, if
the domain name system cannot reliably be considered authoritative of the
resources available, its value diminishes remarkably  -- if an Internet user
does not have confidence that typing www.yahoo.com will yield the
information she expects, then the DNS request will be of far less value. And
while there are good arguments that the domain name system has outlived its
usefulness as a uniform means of addressing the Internet searching problem,
we think that an unsegmented domain name system remains a significant
value to Internet users.177  This premise  that an unsegmented domain name
system is desirable  has substantial policy implications for realspace
sovereigns.  In the following section, we take up this issue.
C
Uns egment ing  Po licy:  Realsp ace  So vereig ns and  Domai n  Name s
                                                                                                                       
people using Chinese characters live in the mainland and Taiwan, the U.S.
government has no right to authorize any company to manage Chinese domain
names with Chinese characters, said CNNIC director Hu Qiheng . . . . A company
shouldn't be allowed to provide Chinese domain names registration services in China
without the approval of the Chinese government.); ., Character debate: CNNIC
opposes foreign firms registering Chinese-language domain names, CHINAONLINe,
Nov. 3, 2000 (explaining how China is objecting to the registration and use of
Chinese-character domain names by foreign entities) (Lexis).; Furious Fight Arises in
Registration of Chinese Domain Names, Xinhua General News Service, Nov. 17,
2000 (Lexis) (same); China to strengthen management of Chinese-character domain
names, CHINAONLINE, Nov. 15, 2000 (Lexis); China Channel, CNNIC Disagree
Over Chinese Character International Domain Names, CHINAONLINE, Oct. 10,
2000 (Lexis) (same).  At present, the ICANN-approved registrars are still registering
such domain names.  See Verisign, Key Points About the VeriSign Global Registry Services
Internationalized Domain Name Testbed (2001) http://www.verisign-
grs.com/idn/keypts.html.
176 This appears to be a nearly universal sentiment.  See, e.g., Internet Architecture
Board (Network Working Group), IAB Technical Comment on the Unique DNS
Root (Request for Comments 2826) (May 2000); ICANN, ICP-3: A Unique,
Authoritative Root for the DNS (July 9, 2001) at http://www.icann.org/icp/icp-3.htm;
[others]
177 We think a not insignificant argument can be made that the development of a
segmented domain name system would so dramatically devalue the system as to
generate alternatives to the searching and selection problem that may prove at least
as effective as the present domain name system  One obvious example might be an
increasing investment in web search engines or directories.  Or the development of
new technologies, such as the RealNames keywords system.  See, e.g.,
RealNames.com.  The rise of and eventual replacement by alternatives to the domain
name system should not necessarily be viewed as unfortunate.  Nonetheless, an
unsegmented domain name system appears at present to be high on the list of
valuable approaches to the searching problem.
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The present United States approach to domain name regulation178
appears to be focused solely on the potential for harm to a particular form of
indigenous commercial interests  namely, trademarks.  Little legislative
attention has be paid to the significant value in the unsegmented domain
name system  -- or more particularly, the significant diminishment in value
should the system become segmented.  This omission becomes all the more
serious when one considers that the aggressive assertion of jurisdiction in the
ACPA179 may well satisfy the conditions under which the domain name
system becomes segmented: the encouragement of responsive actions on the
part of other sovereigns.180  This is, we think, a perilous path  one that risks
harming the growth and development of the global Internet, and
correspondingly portends harm to United States interests.
In this section, we briefly discuss the justifications and contours of a
more encompassing approach to the regulation of domain names by realspace
sovereigns  in particular the United States.  Such an approach, we argue,
would result in greater deference to and support of the growth of non-
territorial regulatory devices for this uniquely global asset.
1
Encompass ing Interest s
Given that the growth of ecommerce development thus far has
largely redounded to the benefit of the United States commercial interests,181
the continued development of the Internet should be viewed as beneficial;
concomitantly, obstacles to such growth should be avoided.182  Weve
established above that an unsegmented domain name system is significantly
                                                      
178 At least as reflected in legislation.  An interesting aspect of this issue is the
apparent tension between the assertive approach taken by the Congress in passing
the ACPA, especially the in rem provisions, and the more hands off version
followed by the Clinton Administration.  See, e.g., White Paper, Memorandum of
Understanding.
179 A claim, we suggest, that can be seen most expansively in the ACPAs in rem
proceedings.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
180 See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
181 Measurement of the commercial activity online is, of course, subject to various
problems.  But under any set of criteria, the United States would seem to be doing
quite well.  The top ten most visited web properties worldwide are all US
companies.  See Neilsen/Netratings, Top 25 Web Properties (October 14, 2001) at
http://pm.netratings.com/nnpm/owa/NRpublicreports.toppropertiesweekly. The top
ten electronic commerce sites (measured in terms of customer sales) is entirely
American.  S e e NextCard Ecommerce Index (September 2001) at
http://www.nextcard.com/Indexes/sept_index_movers10_05_01.html. The top ten
ecommerce businesses in terms of market share are entirely American.  See Nearly
Half of All Americans Buy Online, According to Nielsen//NetRatings and Harris Interactive;
$3.5 Billion Spent Online in March, Jumping 36 Percent in Past Year, BUSINESSWIRE, April
24, 2001.
182 Note here we are setting aside the many (and significant) non-commercial
United States interests in the growth of the internet, including the spread of
democratic values, etc.
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more valuable to the global internet community than one that is partially or
fully segmented.  It follows, then, that avoiding segmentation must be
included as a significant factor in the regulatory calculation for realspace
sovereigns.
We can review this broader approach by explicitly considering the
harm due to segmentation.  Stylizing the situation as a two-player game, well
assume two binary choices  either to assert prescriptive jurisdiction and
regulate, or defer to entities reflective of other sovereigns concerns.183  We
consider three outcomes.  First, if both states defer, the system will remain
unsegmented.  If only one state regulates (and no other state retaliates by
segmenting), the system will remain unsegmented, with some additional
benefit flowing to the regulator.  And if both states regulate, the system
becomes segmented, resulting in a diminishment of value.  Figure 2 sets forth
this basic situation, with the payoffs as noted.
F ig u re 2
Here, the U.S. decision would be to regulate, on the assumption that
State Xs response would be to defer.184  Thus, the Figure 1 example might be
said to describe the present status quo  where the U.S. has regulated to
some degree,185 and other nations appear to be more deferential.
Yet we suggest that an adjustment in the payoffs could well
dramatically alter the nature of this game, as shown in Figure 3.
                                                      
183 As should be apparent, there are a number of middle grounds here that these
models fails to adequately capture.
184 This is a form of a dynamic game with complete information, as state X can
easily see the U.S. decision.  The sub-game represented by the top branch has
expected payoffs of (100, 125), while the bottom branch has payoffs of (125, 100).
Accordingly, the U.S. decision will be to regulate.  See H. Scott Bierman & Luis
Fernandez, GAME T HEORY W ITH ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS 124-135 (1998),
Douglas Baird, Robert Gertner & Randal Picker, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 50-
77 (1994), Eric Rasmussen, GAMES & INFORMATION 108 (3rd Ed. 2001).
185 At least to the extent of the in rem provisions of the ACPA.
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F ig u re 3
Here, weve adjusted the payoff that State X perceives if the United
States regulates and it does not.  This reduction in payoff could be due to
variety of factors  a few of which weve noted above.186  Under these new
conditions, State X will choose to respond to the U.S. regulation with
regulation, and the domain name system will become segmented.
Accordingly, the best U.S. decision is to defer.
Figure 4 notes one final example, where the U.S. payoff to State X
regulation is reduced as well.
                                                      
186 See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
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F ig u re 4
Here again, the best U.S. decision is to regulate.  That such a decision
yields the sub optimal condition of segmentation reveals the nature of this
game as a form of the prisoners dilemma.187
(Note of course that a still better view of this problem is as a
repeated game  that is, each sovereign has many opportunities to decide
whether to regulate or defer.  Thus, if the United States considered the
assertion of regulation by another sovereign to be more harmful to its
interests, it could take the next opportunity to respond by regulating  and
thereby further confirm the sub-optimal nature of this situation.)
2
Towards Coordination
We suggest that the concerns weve outlined above  that the
mapping of the logical control over the domain names system onto
geographic space lends significant potential for realspace sovereigns to exert
regulatory influence on the system, and that the increasing awareness of this
power and the availability of alternative root server systems  describe a
substantial danger that the present domain name system will become
segmented.
And yet, as with most prisoners dilemmas, coordination provides a
solution.188  In particular, we think that our analysis here establishes the
                                                      
187 The expected payoffs for the top branch are (25, 125), while the expected payoffs
for the bottom branch are (50, 50).
188 See, e.g., Bierman & Fernandez, supra note __ (noting the difference in
outcomes between cooperative games and noncooperative games); Baird et al, supra
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strong interests that realspace sovereigns (and especially the United States)
have to coordinate their regulatory behavior  with an eye to avoiding
segmentation.
Such coordination will invariably require greater deference to non-
territorial domain name regulatory bodies.  The paradigmatic example of
this, of course, is ICANN.189  As many have observed, there are a number of
substantial problems with the present form of ICANN;190 advocating
international coordination does not, we think, necessarily require
endorsement of the present policies and procedures established by ICANN,
or the way in which that organization has been developed.
As many have noted, the challenge of integrating sovereign interests
into a coherent international regulatory framework is considerable.  We will
not revisit that task here.  Instead, having noted in particular the perverse
incentives created bythe current United States regulatory regime, and the
strong interests the United States has in avoiding segmentation, we offer a
few observations and suggestions for future consideration.
1 .  We firmly believe that the in rem provisions of the ACPA are
misguided and should be repealed or substantially revised.  As we
noted above, they are of only limited value,191 and appear to serve
primarily as a particularly obnoxious example of expansive U.S. claims
to regulate domain names.192
2 .  The United States government (and other realspace sovereigns)
should take a more active role in supporting the development of
international domain name policy coordination. As weve argued
throughout this article, the present ICANN approach of avoiding
any significant government involvement  and instead attempting to
build a strictly nongovernmental regulatory authority  fails to grasp
the unavoidable involvement of realspace sovereigns in domain name
regulation.193  Such support will include diplomatic efforts as well as
concrete actions that lend additional credibility to these
organizations.
3 .  Finally, Congress should consider revising the ACPA to reflect
greater deference to the decisions of international regulatory bodies.
For example, Congress might consider implementing a requirement
that disputing parties seek resolution from the international domain
                                                                                                                       
note __ (observing the importance of binding agreements between parties facing a
prisoners dilemma).
189 The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.  See supra notes
__ for further description and discussion.
190 See, e.g. supra notes __ and accompanying text.
191 See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
192 See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
193 See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
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name regulatory body prior to filing a Federal lawsuit.194  Or lawsuits
in which a decision has been made by the domain name body might
be more limited in their scope, in the nature of an appeal process
rather than an initial action.195
We are under no illusions that the kind of coordination required to
effectively regulate the domain names system will be simple or uncontested.
Yet if we are to maintain the value of the domain name system as a solution
to the searching and selection problem, realspace sovereigns must recognize
the urgent importance of coordination and deference, and tailor their
regulatory approach accordingly.
V
It has become commonplace to describe our world (especially the
economic world) as interdependent.  Increasingly, the flow of capital as
well as goods and services show little respect for traditional sovereign
borders; nations unable or unwilling to respond to economic changes can
suffer harm at the hands of the global marketplace.
The advent of the Internet as a powerful commercial (and social)
medium is likely to present still greater challenges.  For the Internet brings
new meaning to interdependent: in a world where geography is
fundamental to our understandings of sovereignty, the contested aspects of
online territoriality mean that regulation might occur everywhere, or even
nowhere.  In an era when the effects of a commercial dispute in cyberspace
might be felt both everywhere and nowhere, realspace sovereigns have great
power to affect the global progress of the Internet.  And there is perhaps no
nation with as much at stake in this game as the United States, and no nation
with as much power to lead the community of nations in determining the
nets future.
Yet the evidence of the U.S. approach to date has not been
altogether heartening.  With respect to the regulation of domain names 
perhaps the canary in the coal mine of global internet regulation  the U.S.
appears, via enactment of the ACPA, and especially its self-styled in rem
provisions, to have acted in an ill-informed manner that may be contrary to
its long-term interests.  As we argued above, these statutory provisions suffer
                                                      
194 The analogy here would be to administrative exhaustion principles.
195 Note that the ICANN UDRP proceedings explicitly allow parties the right to
seek relief from a court prior to actions being taken against a domain name.  See
UDRP, ¶ 4(k).  This is in the nature of granting an appellate right; we suggest that
Congress may want to formalize such an appellate process as part of an effort to
recognize the authority of international domain name regulation.  Cf. Parisi v.
Netlearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745, 752-53 (E.D. Va. 2001) (holding that UDRP
decisions do not fall within the limited scope of review for arbitration awards
provided by the Federal Arbitration Act).
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from the double ignominy of being both of little value196 and inapt.197
We do not, however, believe that all is lost, or that the current U.S.
approach to domain name regulation will inexorably lead to the segmentation
of the domain name system.  To the contrary, the mere presence of the
ICANN dispute resolution mechanism as well as the absence (to date) of any
serious attempts by other sovereigns198 to assert jurisdiction over domain
names demonstrates, we think, that this problem is not unsolvable at an
international scale.  But any discussion about the future of international
regulation of domain names (and, in a larger sense, the Internet) must
proceed with full awareness of the essential role that realspace sovereigns
play in both the form and the content of any regulatory approach.
                                                      
196 Useless in the sense that anytime the section authorizing the in rem assertion of
jurisdiction (over known persons) will be necessary, it will also violate the US
Constitution to accept jurisdiction.  See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
197 Inapt in a strategic sense: because it works an aggressive approach to
jurisdiction over domain names that creates significant incentives for other countries
to regulate, thus raising the possibility of segmenting the domain name system.  See
supra notes __ and accompanying text.
198 Except, perhaps, China.  See supra note __ and accompanying text.
